Rone v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education The trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when the case at issue was an action or proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but did not involve one of the civil rights listed in that section.
Maracich v. Spears Lawyers who used FOIA requests to the South Carolina DMV to find plaintiff car buyers for a potential class action against car dealers for collection of unlawful fees did not violate a federal privacy statute that protects drivers’ personal information; the 4th Circuit upholds summary judgment for the lawyers who satisfied the “litigation” exception to the driver privacy statute.
North Carolina State Bar v. Barrett The complaint alleged a single false representation by the defendant-attorney in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct: the entry of a $7,400 loan from the seller to the buyer as a “down payment” on a HUD-1 statement, which defendant contended was approved by the lender’s loan officer Paul Johnson. However, at the hearing, the State Bar presented evidence of different alleged acts of fraud and additional alleged misrepresentations: that defendant had produced and submitted to the lender a different HUD-1 statement, which contained different financial information and included a forged signature purporting to be the seller’s. The failure to give defendant notice of the misconduct with which she was charged violated her right to due process.
North Carolina State Bar v. Staples Even though $81,000 was mistakenly wired into the defendant-attorney’s trust account, the funds constituted “entrusted property” within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Wachovia Securities LLC v. Brand A securities firm that lost its FINRA arbitration proceeding against former employees who left to work for a competitor winds up paying over $1 million in attorney’s fees under a South Carolina statute that penalizes frivolous lawsuits; the 4th Circuit affirms the district court order refusing to vacate the arbitration award in favor of the former employees and upholding the award of $15,080 in treble damages and $1.1 million in attorney’s fees under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act.
Royster v. McNamara In a prior fraud case against the current plaintiff — Kevin Royster — and other employees in a family business, the family’s motion for a new trial was denied, and this court affirmed the denial. However, in the fraud case, both the jury instructions and the new trial motion applied to the family as a group and not to Mr. Royster individually. There was evidence that Mr. Royster had no dealings with the fraud plaintiff. Mr. Royster’s legal malpractice claim against the family’s attorney in the fraud case is not barred by collateral estoppel.
Danius v. Rodgers Even though the plaintiff-clients allege that the defendant-attorney’s negligence caused them to settle their claims against third parties for less than those claims would have otherwise been worth, the clients’ settlement of those claims constitutes an election of remedies and bars their claims against the attorney.
We affirm summary judgment for defendants.
In re Liotti A New York lawyer with 33 years’ experience and an “AV rating,” who acted as court-appointed counsel in successfully appealing his client’s sentence for wire fraud and identity theft, has received a public admonition from the 4th Circuit for multiple misrepresentations in his representation of his client on appeal, including an assertion that the trial judge suppressed a letter from an informant.
North Carolina State Bar v. Hunter The defendant-attorney failed to serve process on a contractor and consultant, failed to have the summonses extended, and failed to answer the contractor and consultant’s complaint; moreover, she failed to file an answer on behalf of the same client in a separate matter. Defendant did not diligently represent her client.
We affirm the State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission’s censure of defendant.
In re Petition for Reinstatement of McGee There is an administrative procedure for having a suspended law license reinstated; it is set out in 27 N.C.A.C. § 01B.0125(b). Petitioner cannot avoid this procedure by simply moving to amend the records of the State Bar to say that his law license had been reinstated and to strike portions of the Bar’s record reflecting otherwise.
We affirm the Disciplinary Hearing Commission’s denial of petitioner’s motion to amend the Bar’s records.