By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: May 7,2013
State Health Plan for Teachers & State Employees v. Barnett Although the defendant-attorney was following his defendant-client’s instructions when he disbursed all of the settlement proceeds to her and none to plaintiff, under G.S. 135-45.15 (now § 135-48.37), the attorney must pay plaintiff’s lien.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: May 7,2013
Revolutionary Concepts v. Clements Walker PLLC Based on our courts’ treatment of the assignability of other personal tort claims, we adopt the majority view and conclude that malpractice claims are not assignable in North Carolina. We reverse and remand the trial court’s 2010 order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff Carter for lack of standing. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff Revolutionary Concepts. We affirm the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motions under N.C. R. Civ. P. 15 and 17. Facts Plaintiff Carter invented an “Automated Audio Video Messaging and Answering System.” He hired the defendant-law firm to obtain patent protection for his invention in the U.S. and abroad. According to plaintiffs, defendants’ actions made it impossible for plaintiffs to obtain international patent protection for the invention. Plaintiff also founded two corporations. Both were called Revolutionary Concepts, Inc. One was an N.C. corporation (RCI-NC), and the other was a Nevada corporation (RCI-NV). Plaintiff assigned his patent rights to RCI-NC. The two corporations later merged, with RCI-NV as the surviving entity. Standing
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: April 26,2013
In re Gregory & Parker, Inc Even if the debtor-corporation has claims against its principals (who have filed their own bankruptcy petition), the principals’ attorney may nevertheless represent both the principals and the corporation in this adversary action against a common creditor.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: April 25,2013
Callaway v. Cofield An attorney who formerly represented a bankruptcy debtor may be deposed by the bankruptcy trustee. Issues of attorney-client privilege will be handled on a question-by-question basis, and the attorney is hereby ordered to respond to questions which involve confidential information that is not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: April 24,2013
Callaway v. Cofield An attorney who formerly represented a bankruptcy debtor may be deposed by the bankruptcy trustee. Issues of attorney-client privilege will be handled on a question-by-question basis, and the attorney is hereby ordered to respond to questions which involve confidential information that is not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: April 15,2013
Keyes v. Johnson Where our Court of Appeals held, In a guardianship proceeding, the clerk of court found a conflict of interest and removed the plaintiff-attorney as counsel for defendant’s ward and the ward’s wife. Since the attorney did not appeal that order, she was collaterally estopped from seeking fees pursuant to her contract with the ward and his wife, we affirm in part and find that discretionary review was improvidently allowed in part.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: March 20,2013
O’Neal v. O’Neal Local rules require all attorneys of record to attend pre-trial conferences, and a judge admonished the appellant-attorney for failing to attend her client’s pre-trial conference; the admonishment was not a sufficient basis for the attorney’s motion to recuse the judge.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: March 19,2013
O’Neal v. O’Neal Local rules require all attorneys of record to attend pre-trial conferences, and a judge admonished the appellant-attorney for failing to attend her client’s pre-trial conference; the admonishment was not a sufficient basis for the attorney’s motion to recuse the judge.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: March 6,2013
Carle v. Wyrick, Robbins, Yates & Ponton, LLP Even if plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until the IRS issued a final assessment in 2010, and even though the defendant-attorneys continued to provide services to plaintiffs on related matters, since the attorneys’ role in plaintiffs’ business transaction – which resulted in their tax liability – was complete on June 10, 2005, plaintiffs’ Jan. 25, 2010 legal malpractice claim is barred by the four-year statute of repose.
By North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff
Published: February 28,2013
Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman v. Brewer When a law firm that was organized as a limited liability company splits up, contingent fee engagements are assets of the LLC. In order to liquidate the LLC, profits from the contingent fee engagements must be divided, based on the attorney-hours expended before and after the LLC’s dissolution.
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Russell v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources Since the evidence indicated that, when plaintiffs’ lot was supposedly tested for septic tank suitability, the soil sample was apparently taken from a different lot, expert testimony was unnecessary to show professional malpractice. We affirm the Industrial Commission’s conclusion that defendant was negligent; however, we reverse the damage award and remand for further proceedings on this issue.
State v. Bean Although the state elicited evidence that defendant exercised her right to remain silent, given the other evidence of defendant’s guilt – her own admissions to a nurse, “I killed my husband just because I finally had enough of him” and “I’m guilty” and the victim’s fear that defendant would kill him – the prosecutor’s comments and questions regarding whether defendant mentioned self-defense prior to trial had little bearing on the jury finding defendant guilty.
State v. Primus Even though the list of the elements of attempted felonious larceny set out in State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. 276, 473 S.E.2d 362 (1996), included “falling short of the completed offense,” and even though the state proved that defendant completed the offense of felonious larceny, this does not require the conclusion that proof of the completed offense disproves the attempt to commit. The completed commission of a crime must of necessity include an attempt to commit the crime.
