Monitech Inc. v. Robertson Since plaintiff - a longtime vendor of breath alcohol ignition interlock devices — has no property interest in the N.C. DMV’s 2008 guidelines for certification and request for certification (the 2008 RFC), plaintiff lacks standing to challenge DMV’s termination of the 2008 RFC.
American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper North Carolina’s Ethanol Blending Statute – which allows gasoline marketers in our state to participate in the blending of ethanol and gasoline (and the tax credits that go along with such blending) – does not conflict with and is not preempted by the Federal Renewable Fuel Program, the Lanham Act, or the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, nor does the Ethanol Blending Statute violate the Commerce Clause.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
Northrup v. Albert Where defendant Deputy Goudelock had the impression that plaintiff was speeding, this was sufficient to warrant the deputy’s initial stop of plaintiff. In addition, Deputy Goudelock began to follow plaintiff (and only observed the alleged speeding) following what he believed to be plaintiff leaving the scene of an accident in which plaintiff was involved.
Stuart v. Huff G.S. § 90-21.85 requires a medical provider to display images of an abortion patient’s ultrasound so she may see them and to simultaneously explain the display, including the presence, location, and dimensions of the fetus along with the presence of external members and internal organs, if present and viewable. This compelled speech does not withstand strict scrutiny.
U.S. v. Guijon-Ortiz A police officer who questioned a pickup passenger’s alien legal residence card during a routine traffic stop did not violate the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights when he extended the stop to call the local customs office to check the validity of the passenger’s identification, and the 4th Circuit affirms defendant passenger’s conviction for illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Baysden v. State The trial court erred by granting the state’s summary judgment motion and denying the summary judgment motion filed by plaintiff since he has a right under N.C. Const. art. I, § 30 to possess a firearm despite the prohibition set out in G.S. § 14-415.1.
State v. Yencer The Campus Police Act’s provision of secular police protection for the benefit of the students, faculty, and staff of Davidson College, as applied to defendant’s conviction for driving while impaired, does not offend the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that her arrest and conviction for driving while impaired were influenced by any consideration other than secular enforcement of a criminal statute, G.S. § 20-138.1.
Preston v. Leake A North Carolina statute that prohibits a registered lobbyist from contributing to the campaign of any candidate for the N.C. General Assembly or the Council of State does not violate the free speech and association rights of appellant lobbyist, and the 4th Circuit upholds the district court decision rejecting the lobbyist’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Brown v. Winders If, as plaintiff has alleged, the defendant-deputy told the 62-year-old overweight, disabled plaintiff that the deputy knew plaintiff wasn’t the one riding plaintiff’s motorcycle when it sped away from the deputy, then the deputy violated plaintiff’s clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures when he arrested her for fleeing to elude arrest.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to plaintiff’s state-law claims against the defendant-sheriff. Otherwise, the motion is denied.
Lanier Construction Co. v. City of Clinton Since the defendant-city was entitled to exercise a great deal of discretion in awarding a construction contract to the lowest responsible bidder, a disappointed bidder - like plaintiff - has no protected property interest in the contract.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to plaintiff’s claims of due process violation, defamation, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, and breach of contract.
