In re Hutchinson Where the state agreed to the removal of a sex offender from its sex offender registry, it cannot ask the courts to rescind the removal because offenders are required to be registered for 10 years when the state raises that issue for the first time on appeal. The trial court, which upheld the removal, has subject matter jurisdiction on petitions of termination of registration even when the sex offenders have been registered in North Carolina for less than the normally requisite 10 years.
State v. Reynolds Even though, when the trial judge informed defendant of the maximum sentence he could receive if he pled guilty, the judge was only off by three months, we cannot say that an additional three months of possible imprisonment is not prejudicial. Further, we are reluctant to establish precedent for a trial court’s providing incorrect information to a defendant prior to accepting a guilty plea.
State v. Shaw Even though a defendant may waive his right to be present at trial, he has no right to be absent from his trial.
State v. Williams Although the bail-bond surety located and surrendered defendant to the sheriff on the 150th day after her failure to appear, the surety did so at 9:40 p.m., after the courthouse had closed for the day. We do not agree that the 150-day period set out in G.S. § 15A-544.5 extends until 11:59 p.m. on the 150th day.
State v. Ellerbee Although the trial court should not have admitted evidence that defendant had assaulted someone else and that a defense witness had been convicted of manslaughter in 1986 (released in 1991), the evidence of defendant’s guilt was so overwhelming that these errors were not prejudicial: (1) The victim testified that he observed defendant’s face and recognized his voice during the beating, (2) Katie Lane testified that she recognized defendant’s voice as being the one who was yelling at the victim in the road, and (3) Abbie McRae testified that she witnessed defendant beating the victim, had a conversation with defendant, and had known defendant her entire life.
State v. Holder The colloquy among the trial court, defense counsel, and defendant shows that defense counsel explained to the trial court in defendant’s presence that defendant had consented to permitting his counsel to concede to the jury that he was guilty of “something other than felony fleeing ... to elude arrest.”
State v. Cox Where a gun was found along the “flight path” of the driver who ran from the car in which defendant was a passenger, and where the only evidence that defendant possessed the gun was defendant’s extrajudicial confession, the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
State v. Adams Even though, at trial, defendant denied arranging to meet confidential informant Shaw and testified that he did not know he was arranging a cocaine deal, this testimony is to be weighed against the uncontradicted evidence of defendant’s physical presence at the scene of the cocaine purchase, his borrowing and driving the truck delivering the cocaine, the phone calls to and from Shaw and Kendrick Armstrong (who provided the cocaine), and defendant’s admissions to law enforcement shortly after his arrest. Defendant failed to meet his burden of presenting credible evidence that he was entrapped and that he was not predisposed to commit the crime charged. The trial court correctly denied defendant’s request for a jury instruction on entrapment.
State v. Harrison Witness Kristyn Stanco testified that her past recorded statement refreshed her memory; nevertheless, she was allowed to read that statement to the jury. Even if this was error, it was not plain error. Stanco testified independently about the contents of the statement, and the jury heard nothing from her reading of the statement that it did not hear from her. In addition, defendant had the opportunity both to cross-examine Stanco about the statement and to testify himself when he took the stand.
State v. King A partial transcript allowed for meaningful review of defendant’s drug trial; however, the near-complete lack of a transcript of defendant’s habitual felon status hearing requires a remand for a new proceeding.
