Marks v. Marks Where the parties were separated and intended to live separate and apart forever when they entered into an oral contract, and where the contract involves payments for spousal support and from the sale of marital or divisible property, the contract was governed by G.S. § 52-10.1. Because the contract was not in writing and acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer as defined in G.S. § 52-10(b), it was unenforceable.
Schweizer v. Patterson The equitable distribution order appears (1) without explanation, to ignore the fact that certain assets were stipulated to be separate property and (2) to improperly consider passive increases to the value of separate property. Moreover, using the figures set out in the order, our calculations do not match those of the trial court.
McCollum v. McCollum Following the parties’ separation, the defendant-husband maintained most of the marital debts. After recognizing the husband’s payments, the trial court granted the plaintiff-wife a set-off against these payments based on the rental value of the marital residence because the husband remained there after the separation ...
Melson v. Crane Where the plaintiff-husband’s poor management of the defendant-wife’s investment account led to a loss of $57,503, the trial court did not err when it awarded an unequal division of marital property in favor of the wife.
Curtis v. Curtis The trial court should have applied the coverture fraction (the numerator representing the number of years of marriage which occurred simultaneously with the employment which earned the pension, and the denominator representing the total years of employment during which the pension accrued) to the accrued benefits of the plaintiff-husband’s 401(k) plan, calculated as of the date of separation. Since the court failed to do so, we remand.
In re G.B.R. The trial court failed to consider any evidence of changed conditions – respondent’s progress in prison, his release from prison, his employment and living conditions -- in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect. Thus, the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights is not supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
Blackburn v. Bugg In support of her claim for cost-of-living increases to her alimony – which were called for in the parties’ premarital agreement – plaintiff presented computer printouts from the U.S. Department of Labor’s website. Even if defendant had preserved the issue of authentication for appeal, plaintiff’s testimony about obtaining the printouts from the DOL website and the “UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS” heading on the printouts were sufficient to prove that the computer printouts were what plaintiff purported them to be. Moreover, the consumer price index information set forth in the computer printouts is public information subject to judicial notice.
Murn v. Murn Where the trial court neglected to make a finding as to the number of hours worked by plaintiff’s counsel, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further findings as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award. Otherwise, we affirm.
Praver v. Raus The trial court did not need to make findings of fact as to the adequacy of plaintiff’s remedy at law before specifically enforcing the parties’ separation agreement as to future payments. However, the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the adequacy of plaintiff’s remedy at law before awarding her specific enforcement as to arrearages under the separation agreement.
In re P.D.R. Our Court of Appeals applied G.S. § 15A-1242 to find that a trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the respondent in a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceeding to waive her right to counsel. Section 15A-1242 applies in criminal proceedings and has no application in TPR proceedings.
