Pickney v. Department of Transportation Even though the parties’ settlement agreement provided that plaintiff could “request a job reallocation or pay grade increase” and that defendant would “cooperate with such a request,” the settlement agreement did not provide plaintiff with any guarantee that he would actually receive a job reallocation or pay grade increase upon request. Even if plaintiff proved that defendant breached the settlement agreement by failing to cooperate with his request for a second job reallocation, plaintiff’s evidence provided no basis upon which the trial court could have properly calculated damages.
Dawkins v. Richmond County Schools Plaintiff alleges that he was let go from his teaching position because, according to a school administrator, the defendant-principal “had a problem with” plaintiff’s sexual orientation. This allegation is sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Dulaney v. Inmar, Inc. Before Jan. 1, 2010, the defendant-employer gave the plaintiff-employee a copy of its “2010 Promotion Services Rebate and Fulfillment Services Sales and Renewal Incentive Plan.” According to the Plan, incentive payments were to be made approximately six weeks after the end of the quarter in which the qualifying sales were made; moreover, one had to be a Plan participant at the time of the payout in order to receive the incentive payment. Plaintiff resigned on July 22, 2010, prior to the Plan’s incentive payout date for the quarter ending June 30, 2010; therefore, the employer did not violate the Wage and Hour Act when it failed to make incentive payments to plaintiff for her second-quarter sales.
Hershner v. Employment Security Commission Petitioner was repeatedly insubordinate to her supervisor in that she divulged confidential information to a complainant of her employer-agency without considering the possible consequences of such disclosure, violated a known policy of communicating with complainants about a determination in their case prior to the issuance of an agency determination, repeatedly communicated with a complainant after being directed not to so communicate, and failed to work on an appellate brief after repeatedly being instructed to focus solely on the brief by her supervisor. Petitioner violated reasonable job requirements that were within her control; therefore, the Employment Security Commission properly concluded that petitioner was terminated for substantial fault.
Williamson v. Carolina Power & Light Co. Defendant documented plaintiff’s poor job performance, and plaintiff’s own opinion is insufficient to show that she was performing her job in a manner that met her employer’s legitimate expectations. Therefore, she cannot show that she was terminated as a result of sex discrimination.
Cole v. City of Charlotte Where plaintiff denies writing an email that criticized the city attorney’s office, she cannot claim that her right to freedom of speech was violated when she was allegedly fired for writing the email.
Fatta v. M & M Properties Management, Inc. Even though plaintiff was fired shortly after he notified his supervisor that he might be filing a workers’ compensation claim, mere temporal proximity was insufficient to establish that retaliatory motive was a substantial factor in defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff. In plaintiff’s termination letter, defendant stated that plaintiff’s lack of demonstrated leadership, reflected through his tardiness during training, lack of demonstrated initiative, dealings with challenging customers, phone skills, and inability to embrace defendant’s concepts versus trying to incorporate aspects of full service hotels, was the reason supporting plaintiff’s termination.
Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. The 4th Circuit dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a plaintiff’s ERISA suit challenging termination of his long-term disability benefits; the district court order denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment and remanding the case to the plan administrator was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Ryan v. Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. Since plaintiff has admitted that she suffered only from a transitory impairment in November and December 2008 following knee-replacement surgery, she is alleging that she was discriminated against because she was “regarded as having” a disability. The 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to plaintiff’s claim, and those amendments clarify that a person who is “regarded as” disabled is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, plaintiff cannot make out a claim of disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate.
Fatta v. M & M Properties Management, Inc. Even though plaintiff was fired shortly after he notified his supervisor that he might be filing a workers’ compensation claim, mere temporal proximity was insufficient to show that the shortcomings outlined in plaintiff’s termination letter were merely a pretext for firing plaintiff in violation of the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act. In the letter, defendant stated that plaintiff’s lack of demonstrated leadership, reflected through his tardiness during training, lack of demonstrated initiative, dealings with challenging customers, phone skills, and inability to embrace defendant’s concepts versus trying to incorporate aspects of full service hotels, was the reason supporting plaintiff’s termination.
