A chief warrant officer in the U.S. Coast Guard Reserves, who left his job as a municipal waste manager for periods of active service with the Coast Guard, waited too long to file his suit under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, and the 4th Circuit affirms the district court decision that the suit is barred by the four-year federal “catchall” statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).
Bigelow v. Town of Chapel Hill North Carolina does not recognize direct constitutional claims against public officials acting in their individual capacities
Hill v. Hubbell Distribution, Inc. Had he called the evening before he was summoned for jury duty, plaintiff would have learned that he had been excused. The defendant-employer fired plaintiff because its investigation convinced it that plaintiff was dishonest about why he missed a day of work; plaintiff has not shown that he was fired because he was summoned for jury duty
Pledger v. UHS-Pruitt Corp. The complaint can be read to allege timely claims of discrimination and retaliation based on plaintiff’s termination. Given the nature of plaintiff’s pro se complaint, defendants understandably did not address this issue. They may do so in an answer and, if desired, a new motion to dismiss.
Austin v. Alltell Communications, LLC Despite one positive performance review and a new supervisor who made disparaging remarks about her own and plaintiff’s age, plaintiff’s history of performance problems shows that she was not fired because of her age.
Austin v. Alltell Communications, LLC Despite one positive performance review and a new supervisor who made disparaging remarks about her own and plaintiff’s age, plaintiff’s history of performance problems shows that she was not fired because of her age.
Westbrook v. North Carolina A&T State University Even though the pro se plaintiff lacks the financial ability to hire counsel and arguably has a meritorious religious discrimination claim, he has not tried to obtain counsel, and he has demonstrated the ability to represent himself.
Corl v. Burlington Coat Factory of North Carolina, LLC Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the defendant-employer did not change its story about why it fired plaintiff; the record shows that defendant has maintained from the beginning that it fired plaintiff because it suspected her of defrauding the company by placing a mark-down price tag on new merchandise that she intended to buy for herself.
Bordonaro v. Johnston County Board of Education Under the more liberal standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA), the plaintiff-teaching assistant’s alleged loss of peripheral vision may qualify as a disability.
Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C. T. Phelps, Inc. The trial court correctly found a public policy violation in the plaintiff-temp agency’s contract with its employees; the contract prohibited plaintiff’s employees from discussing or accepting employment at plaintiff’s clients where the employee had been placed for work by plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted that its primary purpose in requiring job applicants to execute the non-competition agreement was to prevent its employees from going to work for another temp agency.
We affirm summary judgment for defendants.
Plaintiff conceded that its employees do not have access to trade secrets or proprietary information as a result of their employment with plaintiff.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement is merely an attempt to stifle lawful competition between businesses and that it unfairly hinders the ability of plaintiff’s former employees to earn a living.
The noncompetition agreement is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Because the noncompetition agreement is unenforceable, the contract cannot support plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with contract, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on that claim.
In its unfair trade practices claim, plaintiff alleges that when defendant CTP, Inc. “flipped” some of its employees, CTP altered the dates on some of the job applications submitted to CTP by plaintiff’s employees. As a result of these alterations, it appears as if the flipped employees began working for CTP before they left plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff contends that CTP then billed, and collected money from, plaintiff’s client for the work performed by the temporary workers while they were plaintiff’s employees.
