Smith v. City of Fayetteville Electronic gaming operations are legal, and the city has the authority to impose a privilege license tax on legal businesses. But the city may not impose a tax so prohibitively high that it prevents a business owner from conducting a profitable business unless the city can show that the tax was necessary to pay for increased police enforcement, or that the businesses suffered because of mismanagement rather than the increased tax.
Wally v. City of Kannapolis Even though G.S. § 160A-383 prohibits judicial review of a municipality’s “statement of reasonableness”, a court can nevertheless review whether a municipality made such a statement at all.
T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors In this appeal, we consider certain “prohibition” and “discrimination” challenges brought by a wireless telecommunications provider against a local governing body under a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), and conclude the Fairfax County, Va., board of supervisors did not violate the Act in denying a request filed by T-Mobile Northeast LLC to construct a wireless service facility on an existing transmission pole.
Templeton Properties, L.P. v. Town of Boone On a prior appeal, we remanded so the respondent-town’s board of adjustment could make reviewable findings of fact based on its 2007 public hearings. Instead, the board allowed new testimony from opponents of petitioner’s application for a special use permit -- while not allowing new testimony from petitioner -- and made findings of fact that were obviously influenced by the new testimony.
IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton Several Lumberton businesses sell internet usage time to customers, and their customers also receive free sweepstakes entries with their internet-usage time purchases. The businesses have failed to show that the Town of Lumberton acted improperly when it dramatically increased the cost of a privilege license for these businesses (and not for other types of businesses).
Orange County v. Town of Hillsborough G.S. § 160A-392 grants the respondent-town the authority to apply zoning ordinances to the construction or use of the petitioner-county’s addition to the county courthouse. The trial court correctly found that the county had to be in compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances, particularly ordinance § 6.6, which requires this type of facility to provide a specific number of parking spaces based on the number of employees and the size of the facility.
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Our Court of Appeals held that the defendant-town was not responsible for setting up or funding schools, and it lacked statutory authority to charge developers and/or builders a fee designed to ensure adequate funding for area schools. With Justice Jackson not participating, the remaining members of the court are equally divided, with three members voting to reverse and three members voting to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In re Appeal of Peacock Even though the board of adjustment’s rules required it to enter its final decision in its minutes, and even though this was not accomplished until July 14, 2010, since the board’s written ruling was issued and signed by the zoning administrator and board chairman on May 17, 2010 and then filed with the town’s records on May 18, 2010, G.S. § 160A-388(e2) required petitioner to seek judicial review by June 18, 2010, and his July 28, 2010 petition was untimely.
Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc. v. Town of Pineville Where the plaintiff-restaurant took down its nonconforming sign to replace the awning underneath it and then put the same sign back up on the new awning, the restaurant “replaced” the sign within the meaning of the defendant-town’s zoning ordinance.
We affirm the superior court’s order upholding the town’s citation of the restaurant for violations of the zoning ordinance.
McCrann v. Village of Pinehurst Petitioners did not make a formal request for notice of the village council’s decision, and their petition for judicial review was filed 31 days after the council filed its decision.
We affirm the superior court’s dismissal of the petition as untimely filed.
