Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t Inc. v. Kurtz A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments cannot sue county officials on a claim the county reduced funding in retaliation for plaintiffs’ opposition to local legislation; the 4th Circuit affirms dismissal of the suit by the district court, who declined to inquire into defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment.
Hutchins v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor A U.S. Postal Service letter carrier who won a personal-injury lawsuit against a South Carolina town after she fell into a manhole must reimburse the Department of Labor for benefits she received under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act; the 4th Circuit affirms a decision that the town qualifies as a “person other than the U.S.” under 5 U.S.C. § 8132.
ExperienceOne Homes, LLC v. Town of Morrisville After successfully seeking to have their property rezoned, plaintiffs made major alterations in their subdivision’s design: a switch from townhomes to detached single-family homes, increased density, rearrangement of lots, reduced greenspace, altered road placement, and the failure to include a required bridge. Despite switching from townhomes to detached single-family homes, plaintiffs left lot size at 2,500 square feet; the defendant-town’s minimum lot size for detached single-family homes was 6,000 square feet. Since these changes did not qualify as a “minor amendment,” the town properly required plaintiffs to apply for a flexible design option.
Smith v. City of Fayetteville Electronic gaming operations are legal, and the city has the authority to impose a privilege license tax on legal businesses. But the city may not impose a tax so prohibitively high that it prevents a business owner from conducting a profitable business unless the city can show that the tax was necessary to pay for increased police enforcement, or that the businesses suffered because of mismanagement rather than the increased tax.
Wally v. City of Kannapolis Even though G.S. § 160A-383 prohibits judicial review of a municipality’s “statement of reasonableness”, a court can nevertheless review whether a municipality made such a statement at all.
T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors In this appeal, we consider certain “prohibition” and “discrimination” challenges brought by a wireless telecommunications provider against a local governing body under a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), and conclude the Fairfax County, Va., board of supervisors did not violate the Act in denying a request filed by T-Mobile Northeast LLC to construct a wireless service facility on an existing transmission pole.
Templeton Properties, L.P. v. Town of Boone On a prior appeal, we remanded so the respondent-town’s board of adjustment could make reviewable findings of fact based on its 2007 public hearings. Instead, the board allowed new testimony from opponents of petitioner’s application for a special use permit -- while not allowing new testimony from petitioner -- and made findings of fact that were obviously influenced by the new testimony.
IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton Several Lumberton businesses sell internet usage time to customers, and their customers also receive free sweepstakes entries with their internet-usage time purchases. The businesses have failed to show that the Town of Lumberton acted improperly when it dramatically increased the cost of a privilege license for these businesses (and not for other types of businesses).
Orange County v. Town of Hillsborough G.S. § 160A-392 grants the respondent-town the authority to apply zoning ordinances to the construction or use of the petitioner-county’s addition to the county courthouse. The trial court correctly found that the county had to be in compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances, particularly ordinance § 6.6, which requires this type of facility to provide a specific number of parking spaces based on the number of employees and the size of the facility.
Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Our Court of Appeals held that the defendant-town was not responsible for setting up or funding schools, and it lacked statutory authority to charge developers and/or builders a fee designed to ensure adequate funding for area schools. With Justice Jackson not participating, the remaining members of the court are equally divided, with three members voting to reverse and three members voting to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.