Fisher v. Town of Nags Head Plaintiffs, owners of oceanfront properties, sought to preliminarily enjoin a beach nourishment project because the defendant-town did not intend to pay plaintiffs for the easement that the town would need to add sand (and value) to plaintiffs’ properties. The issue of just compensation is one for the condemnation proceeding and not for preliminary injunction. The other issue raised by plaintiffs – that the town’s notice was inadequate – is rejected in part because the notice was sufficient to allow plaintiffs to file suit before the deadline set out in the notice.
Taddei v. Village Creek Property Owners Association, Inc. Even though one paragraph of the subdivision’s restrictive covenants only allows the declarant, or its successors or assigns, to amend the covenants in order to bring them into compliance with town ordinances, another paragraph of the covenants allows a majority of property owners to amend the covenants before they are renewed every 10 years. The defendant-homeowners’ association followed the latter paragraph’s requirements to amend the covenants.
Beroth Oil Co. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation In preparation for a proposed northern beltway around Winston-Salem, the N.C. Department of Transportation has placed many tracts of land in regulatory limbo – the DOT is not yet buying most of the land, but it is restricting the owners’ ability to use the land. Given the uniqueness of land and the variety of uses to which the affected owners have put or may wish to put their land, the owners do not form a class within the meaning of N.C. R. Civ. P. 23.
Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC A homeowner may exercise a right to rescind a mortgage transaction under the Truth in Lending Act by notifying the creditor within the three-year period; the owner is not required to file a lawsuit within the three-year window to exercise the rescission right, and the 4th Circuit reverses a contrary district court decision on a question of law that has split federal appeals courts.
In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust by Wilson The mortgaged property was sold to Fannie Mae subsequent to an order permitting foreclosure, and the trustee’s deed was recorded. There is no indication that the respondent-mortgagor paid a bond to stay the foreclosure sale, nor was there an upset bid during the 10-day period or any indication in the record that respondent obtained a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction prior to the end of the 10-day upset bid period.
Craver v. Raymond Where (1) one-quarter of the restricted lots in a 1919 subdivision have been re-divided in violation of the restrictive covenant, (2) the re-divided lots are not in one area of the subdivision but are dispersed throughout it, and (3) the majority of additional lot owners – though properly served and joined as defendants – have remained silent throughout the course of this litigation, the restriction against re-dividing lots is unenforceable.
Nahigian v. Juno-Loudoun LLC A Northern Virginia couple can get back their $1.674 million purchase price for a lot in a residential community affiliated with the Ritz-Carlton Hotel company; the 4th Circuit says the buyers can rescind the deal under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act and get more prejudgment interest because the developer is not protected by an ILSFDA exemption for developments with less than 100 lots.
Patterson v. City of Gastonia The owners of six demolished mobile homes had adequate alternative remedies for redress of their claim. Someone who is not a property’s owner of record cannot claim that his due process rights were violated because the city failed to investigate his ownership. Finally, mobile home owners cannot bring inverse condemnation claims because mobile homes are personal, not real property.
Metropolitan Group, Inc. v. Meridian Industries The defendant-seller covenanted that it had no “actual knowledge” of the presence or disposal of asbestos, fuel oil, or other hazardous or toxic substances on the land it was selling. The parties’ purchase agreement defines “actual knowledge” as “the current, actual conscious knowledge of the officers and employees of Meridian Dyed Yarn Group” as of the date of closing. Except as to asbestos, the plaintiff-buyer has failed to come forward with evidence that any of the seller’s officers or employees knew, on the date of closing, that such substances were present on the land.
In re Foreclosure of Cornblum In a power of sale proceeding initiated under G.S. § 45-21.16, the clerk of court, and the superior court on appeal from the clerk’s decision, lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider and rule on a party’s motion to compel arbitration. In re Foreclosure of Pugh (March 6, 2012; Lawyers Weekly No. 12-07-0257)
