Diamond v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education Even though the former G.S. § 115C-391(a) permitted the use of force against a student “to maintain order,” when read in the context of the entire statute, it is clear that physical force may be used against a student only in exigent circumstances
In re Dunn Where defendant was ordered to register as a sex offender as a result of his November 1994 conviction in Montgomery County for attempted second-degree sex offense, G.S. § 14-208.12A required him to file his petition to terminate his sex offender registration in Montgomery County.
Union Academy v. Union County Public SchoolsThe trial court’s decision conflicts with this court’s subsequent opinion in Thomas Jefferson Classical Academy v. Rutherford County Board of Education, 715 S.E.2d 625 (2011), disc. review denied, 724 S.E.2d 531 (2012).
Learning Center/Ogden School, Inc. v. Cherokee County Board of Education Even though the defendant-school board waited until near the end of its fiscal year to transfer restricted funds out of its local current expense fund and into a special fund, and even if the restricted funds had already been spent, the transfer allowed the school board to reduce the amount it was required to transfer to the plaintiff-charter school.
Hoke County Board of Education v. State Where the state chose a pre-kindergarten program, “More at Four” (MAF) to address the problems recognized in Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997) (Leandro I), and Hoke County Board of Education v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004) (Leandro II), the trial court had the authority to bar the General Assembly’s attempt to arbitrarily limit the number of at-risk children who could participate in MAF.
B.W. v. Durham Public Schools Despite the respondent-school system’s declaration that it would not consider staffing issues in developing the petitioner-student’s individualized education plan (IEP), staffing issues were fully discussed at the IEP meeting. The school system decided against a full-time one-on-one aide for the time being while leaving open the possibility of more one-on-one time if the student’s progress was not good.
Moss v. Spartanburg County School Dist. Seven A high-school student and her parents lose their First Amendment Establishment Clause challenge to a Spartanburg County public school system’s policy of allowing public school students two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private instructors; the 4th Circuit upholds the program as comparable to allowing credit from private school instruction.
Thomas Jefferson Classical Academy v. Rutherford County Board of Education Under our prior holdings in Delany and Sugar Creek I and II: (1) funds placed into the “local current expense fund” must be considered in computing the amounts due to a charter school; and (2) during the current fiscal year, a local administrative unit may amend its budget to place restricted funds into special funds but may not retroactively amend the budget of a fiscal year that has already ended and the funds expended.
Sugar Creek Charter School, Inc. v. State Our statutes allow charter schools access to local school districts’ current expense funds but not to the local school districts’ capital outlay funds. This arrangement is constitutional; N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) requires the state to establish a uniform system of public schools but does not prohibit the state from setting up additional schools outside the uniform system.
We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment.
Garlock v. Wake County Board of Education. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-07-0401, 55 pp.) (Donna S. Stroud, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court. (William R. Pittman, J.) N.C. App. Click here for the full text of the opinion. Holding: Since the defendant-school board took reasonable measures to provide for public access to its meeting, the [...]
