Harrell v. Palace Entertainment Holdings, Inc. It was up to the Industrial Commission to decide how much weight to give plaintiff’s testimony about his exposure to sodium hypochlorite; moreover, plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony that his single exposure to bleach placed him at an increased risk of developing reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.
Ellison v. Dana Corp. Even though there may be some evidence of a change of condition, the record supports the Industrial Commission’s determination that there was insufficient evidence of a new condition or that plaintiff’s current condition was causally connected to her July 30, 2004 work-related specific traumatic incident.
Hunt v. Public Schools of Robeson County Although police were unable to solve the crime, a middle school principal was able to show that his shooting injury arose out of his job, based on his own testimony about his work-related anti-gang activities and the threatening responses to those activities.
Hurley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. After a deputy commissioner found plaintiff’s injury compensable and awarded plaintiff attorney’s fees under G.S. § 97-90(c), defendants appealed only the attorney’s fee award. However, the full Industrial Commission addressed only the compensability issue and failed to address the issue actually appealed: the attorney’s fee award.
Diaz v. Smith An employer’s power of attorney gave a premium-financing company the authority to request cancellation of the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy if the employer failed to make its premium payments. Therefore, when the employer failed to make its premium payments and the financing company requested cancellation of the workers’ compensation policy, G.S. § 58-35-85 applied. Notice was properly sent to the employer by the financing company.
Briggs v. University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill Dr. Singh testified that, if plaintiff injured his ankle on May 2, 2007 and if the pain from that injury worsened from that date onward, then he believed the May 2, 2007 incident aggravated plaintiff’s preexisting osteochondral defect. Dr. Singh’s testimony was not speculative but contingent. Where the Industrial Commission made unchallenged findings both that plaintiff sustained the May 2, 2007 ankle injury and that plaintiff’s ankle pain “progressively became worse” thereafter, these findings and Dr. Singh’s testimony support the Commission’s conclusion that plaintiff suffered a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition.
Parlier v. Burke County EMS Plaintiff was injured at work on Jan. 2, 2007 and re-injured at work on Nov. 12, 2007. The parties’ July 29, 2009 settlement agreement mainly discussed the original injury but also mentioned the second incident. When plaintiff released “all claims whatsoever under the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act arising prior to the date of this agreement,” he released defendants from liability for both incidents.
Smith v. Lee Construction The defendant-insurer failed to show that it was a party to a preferred provider agreement with the intervenor-hospital. Since the N.C. fee schedule does not apply and there is insufficient evidence of a contractual fee agreement, based on our Medical Fees Section’s determination that the entire balance of $891,904.32 is owed, the Industrial Commission concludes that the $891,904.32 balance represents the usual, customary, and reasonable charges for the services provided to plaintiff by the California hospital.
Hazell v. Family Dollar Inc. Plaintiff didn’t merely receive a raise six weeks before her compensable injury; she was promoted from a part-time hourly position to a full-time salaried position. The Industrial Commission rejects defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s average weekly wage should be determined based on the wages she received during the 52 weeks prior to her injury. Plaintiff’s salary was her average weekly wage.
Pait v. Southeastern General Hospital Once plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement, either party could seek a determination of permanent loss of wage-earning capacity; therefore, it was irrelevant that defendants’ motive in seeking a hearing was to start the running of the statute of limitations on a possible future death benefits claim.
