Moose v. Watkins Even though the defendant-owner paid plaintiff for 40 hours per week to perform heating and air conditioning work on the houses she was having renovated, plaintiff was nevertheless an independent contractor; he was skilled in an area of expertise, he had an assistant, defendant did not control the details of plaintiff’s work, she had no other employees, and plaintiff decided when to work his weekly 40 hours.
Solomon v. NC State Veterans Nursing Home-FayettevilleWhere plaintiff’s medical evidence showed that she had been released to work with restrictions, it was insufficient to prove disability under the medical evidence prong of Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 S.E.2d 454 (1993).
Knowles v. Wackenhut Corp. Where a staff shortage resulted in plaintiff working more overtime than defendant’s employees normally can, and where the staff shortage has been corrected, the Industrial Commission should have calculated plaintiff’s average weekly wage pursuant to the fourth or fifth method in G.S. § 97-2(5) rather than the third.
McAdams v. Safety Kleen Systems, Inc. Where the parties dispute the extent and type of plaintiff’s work-related injuries, we remand since the Industrial Commission failed to make findings of fact as to the circumstances of plaintiff’s accident and relied upon testimony of doctors who may have been provided with an inaccurate account of plaintiff’s accident.
Coffey v. Weyerhaeuser Where a worker reached a settlement agreement with his employer regarding compensation and weekly lifetime benefits for full and permanent disability due to occupational disease, the worker’s heirs are still held to the statutory standard - and barred from seeking death benefits when worker died more than two years after the agreement was signed, or six years after his original date of disability.
Carr v. DHHS The Parsons presumption — addressing whether additional medical treatment is related to a prior injury — may apply when plaintiff’s injury is wholly different from the one accepted on the Form 60. In this case, plaintiff proved her neck injury was causally related to her left hand injury and therefore compensable. However, the Industrial Commission failed to make findings that plaintiff made a reasonable effort to obtain alternative employment, or that to do so would be futile because of preexisting conditions; therefore, plaintiff’s disability ruling is remanded.
Wells v. Coastal Cardiology Associates Plaintiff’s doctors both testified that her pre-existing condition was exacerbated by her fall at work, necessitating surgery, and both doctors said they could not apportion plaintiff’s current condition between her pre-existing condition and the fall. This evidence supports the Industrial Commission’s order that defendants pay for plaintiff’s surgery.
We affirm the Commission’s award of medical expenses.
Quiroz v. Metropols Statuary, Inc. When inclement weather caused the defendant-employer to be closed on a regular pay day, the employer received no benefit when plaintiff asked to pick up his paycheck and the employer agreed to leave it in the employer’s mailbox. Moreover, plaintiff was not on the employer’s premises when - returning to his car after getting his check out of the employer’s mailbox - he slipped and broke his elbow as he tried to prevent himself from falling. Therefore, the coming and going rule bars his claim for workers’ compensation.
Morales v. Greensboro Contracting Corp. Even though an insurance agent failed to carry out the insured employer’s instruction to cancel its workers’ compensation policy with the Cincinnati Casualty Co., since the employer’s letter made it clear that the employer intended to cancel the policy effective Aug. 1, 2005, and since Cincinnati retroactively canceled the policy once it learned of the cancellation, the parties’ intentions control. The employer’s new insurer is not entitled to contribution from Cincinnati.
We reverse the Industrial Commission’s ruling in favor of the new insurer.
Malloy v. Davis Mechanical. Inc. The Industrial Commission erred in considering medical records submitted after the mediation agreement was reached and the plaintiff’s child support lien in determining whether the mediation agreement was fair and just.
