McCoy v. City of Charlotte A superior court judge is not bound by the ruling of another superior court judge on the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Time Warner Entertainment Advance/Newhouse Partnership v. Town of Landis Since the defendant-town has merely proposed a pole-attachment rate to which the plaintiff-cable television provider objects, there is no controversy for the court to adjudicate.
Griffin Farm & Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Unionville Three authorizations are required to build and operate a construction and demolition (C&D) landfill: local zoning approval, a local government franchise, and a permit from the state. Where plaintiffs stopped accepting C&D waste seven months before their franchise expired, and where the defendant-town exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs a new franchise, plaintiffs did not have a common law vested interest to a new franchise agreement.
American Towers, Inc. v. Town of Morrisville In order to get a special use permit to erect a cell phone tower in the respondent-town, petitioner was required to show that the tower would not substantially injure the value of adjoining property. Petitioner’s real estate expert failed to make that showing; therefore, the superior court properly upheld the denial of petitioner’s application to erect a telecommunications tower.
Morgan v. Nash County The plaintiff-city seeks to challenge the county’s re-zoning of a farm for industrial use as a poultry processing plant. The city mounts this challenge because a separate piece of property, which would be used as a sprayfield for treated wastewater from the processing plant, is in the city’s watershed.
MCC Outdoor, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence indicates that the defendant-town caused plaintiff’s billboard to be removed since the only reason the new landowner did not extend plaintiff’s lease was because the town’s special use permit forbade it. However, the town’s forecast of evidence indicates that the new landowner would not have allowed the billboard to remain, even absent the special use permit condition.
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head The defendant-town denied plaintiffs a building permit because their application was incomplete; therefore, plaintiffs cannot challenge a new town ordinance based solely on the town’s threatened or hypothetical denial of a permit under the new ordinance.
Livingston v. Robeson County (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-16-0764, 15 pp.) (John C. Martin, Ch.J.) Appealed from Robeson County Superior Court. (Robert F. Floyd Jr., J.) N.C. App. Unpub.
Holding: The denial of petitioner’s application for a permit to operate a group home was based entirely on evidence of the generalized fears of neighbors; therefore, the denial of the conditional use permit was not based on substantial, material and competent evidence in the record, and it was arbitrary and capricious.
Bullard v. Wake County Although the defendant-county had insurance during the period in which county inspectors okayed construction and occupancy of a house that has since been found unfit for human habitation, an endorsement to the insurance policy (applicable to the first year and a half at issue) limited coverage to “occurrences or wrongful acts for which the defense of governmental immunity is clearly not applicable or for which, after the defense is asserted, a court of competent jurisdiction determines the defense of governmental immunity not to be applicable.”
Huggins, t/a SADISCO of Md. v. Prince George’s County, Md. A property owner who operated a salvage automobile wholesaling business on a parcel adjacent to Andrews Air Force Base’s CERCLA Superfund site, and whose business was cited for numerous county code violations, loses an appeal of the dismissal of its due process and state law claims against Prince George’s County, Md., for shutting down the salvage business pursuant to a consent order; the 4th Circuit says the owner failed to prove oral contracts under Maryland law.