North Carolina Lawyers Weekly
State v. Baker. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-07-1166, 18 pp.) (Barbara Jackson, J.) Appealed from Halifax County Superior Court. (Alma L. Hinton, J.) N.C. App. Click here for the full text of the opinion.
Holding: The arresting officer testified that defendant was free to leave until the officer found defendant’s gun, but where defendant testified that he did not feel free to leave once the officer activated his blue lights and certainly not once four officers and their four patrol cars surrounded him. Hence, there was a material conflict in the evidence, and the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from the search and seizure.
Defendant’s convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon are reversed. We remand for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to defendant’s motion to suppress.
When a trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is assigned as error, we hold that the appropriate standard of review on appeal is as follows: The trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress is fully reviewable for a determination as to whether the two criteria set forth in State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 673 S.E.2d 394 (2009), have been met – (1) whether the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling on the motion to suppress from the bench and (2) whether there was a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
If a reviewing court concludes that both criteria are met, then the findings of fact are implied by the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and shall be binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. If a reviewing court concludes that either of the criteria is not met, then a trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to the mandate of G.S. § 15A-977(f), is fatal to the validity of its ruling and constitutes reversible error.
Because the defendant assigns error to the trial court’s failure to make findings and conclusions in connection with its ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress, we must review the trial court’s ruling to determine whether the trial court provided the rationale for its ruling from the bench and whether there was a material conflict in the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress.
The phrase “material conflict” neither appears in the language of G.S. § 15A-977(f), nor has it been specifically interpreted by our appellate courts.
No N.C. appellate court has held a trial court’s failure to make findings and conclusions constituted reversible error because of a material conflict in evidence at the suppression hearing.
The fact that defendant presented evidence cannot, by itself, be dispositive of whether a material conflict in the evidence existed.
We hold that, for purposes of § 15A-977(f), a material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an opposing party such that the outcome of the matter to be decided is likely to be affected.
At issue at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress was whether defendant was searched and seized in a manner permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Factors to be considered when deciding whether a seizure has occurred include the number of officers present, whether the officer displayed a weapon, the officer’s words and tone of voice, any physical contact between the officer and the individual, whether the officer retained the individual’s identification or property, the location of the encounter, and whether the officer blocked the individual’s path. Evidence by defendant that controverts the state’s evidence relating to any of these factors could create a material conflict in the evidence.
Defendant presented evidence to controvert Officer Moseley’s testimony regarding the number of officers present at the scene and when the other officers arrived. Officer Moseley testified that he and Officer Hardy arrived on the scene at approximately the same time and acknowledged that other officers arrived at the scene, but he could not remember whether the officers were present when he patted down defendant and detected the gun.
Defendant testified that four officers in four separate police cars were present when Officer Moseley asked defendant for his name, with two officers on the same side of the street as defendant and two officers on the other side of the street, with only the blue lights on Officer Moseley’s car activated. Defendant further testified that, after Officer Moseley activated his blue lights, he no longer felt free to leave.
Defendant’s evidence controverts the state’s evidence and creates a material conflict in the evidence because it is likely to affect the outcome – the ultimate questions of the constitutionality of the encounter between Officer Moseley and defendant and whether the evidence should be suppressed.
Defendant argues that he was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Moseley activated his blue lights. The state contends that defendant was free to leave until the time the gun was found.
The activation of blue lights on a police vehicle has been included among factors for consideration to determine when a seizure occurs.
Defendant also testified that, by the time Officer Moseley asked him his name, four police officers were present in four separate patrol vehicles, all four officers having arrived at or near the same time. This testimony by defendant controverts the testimony of Officer Moseley that “Other officers were arriving at some point. I don’t recall if they were there by the time I found the gun or not. I don’t think they were.”
The trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress consists only of the following: “Your motion to suppress is denied. I find that the stop was not unreasonable. A person in defendant’s position could just as well have been a person who was in distress at that time of night, and the officer would have had an obligation to make – to stop and see if this person needed help, as well as preventing possible crimes and investigating past crimes, and that the length of the stop prior to the discovery of the weapon was not unreasonable, and therefore the motion to suppress is denied.”
At the suppression hearing, it was incumbent upon the trial court to determine whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt free to leave. While the state presented evidence that defendant’s freedom to leave had not been impeded upon or restricted and that defendant was free to leave until Officer Moseley detected the gun on defendant’s person, defendant presented evidence that he did not feel free to leave when Officer Moseley activated his blue lights and, further, that he was surrounded by a total of four officers in four separate patrol vehicles.
We conclude that a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists because defendant’s evidence controverts the state’s evidence in a manner that affected the outcome of the matter to be decided. Because a material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing exists, the trial court, by virtue of § 15A-977(f) and Williams, was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, contrary to the mandate of § 15A-977(f), is fatal to the validity of its denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss in this case.
Reversed and remanded.
