Criminal Practice — Jury & Jurors – Misconduct – Trial Court’s Inquiry – Prosecutor’s Closing Argument – Premeditation & Deliberation

State v. Salentine (Lawyers Weekly No. 14-07-0985, 24 pp.) (Linda Stephens, J.) Appealed from Johnston County Superior Court (William Bell, J.) N.C. App.

Holding: During an inquiry into juror misconduct, the trial court did not blindly accept a juror’s answers; instead, the trial court pushed back repeatedly to demand further clarification. Since the trial court was ultimately satisfied that no prejudice resulted from the juror’s misconduct, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial and declined to interview other jurors.

We find no error in defendant’s convictions of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and robbery with a dangerous weapon.

A Florida lawyer whose brother-in-law, Brian Lloyd, was on defendant’s jury sent the trial court a letter accusing Lloyd of conducting internet research about defendant, complaining to his sister about a hold-out juror who had failed to reveal during voir dire that she had a relative who – like defendant – was a drug addict, and trying to get his sister to ask the lawyer to explain the term “malice.” In the face of Lloyd’s reluctance to answer his questions, the trial judge engaged in a searching, skeptical colloquy with Lloyd.

Even if taken as true, the allegations in the lawyer’s letter would not amount to prejudicial misconduct. The letter does not allege that either the lawyer or his wife provided Lloyd with any information about “malice,” whereas Lloyd testified that he actually asked about the definition of “mitigating,” but denied finding any outside information about either term. In any event, the definitions of legal terms do not constitute outside prejudicial information.

The vague allegation that Lloyd “conducted online research about Defendant” is not sufficient to support a claim that prejudicial juror misconduct occurred. The lawyer’s letter is itself hearsay and is vague insofar as it does not identify any specific source for Lloyd’s online research. Lloyd repeatedly denied conducting any online research about defendant and testified that he did not know how to use a computer. Although defendant complains this is simply unbelievable four decades after the advent of the personal computer, we give the trial court’s determinations great deference on appeal and, based on the record before us, we do not believe its decision to credit the testimony of a live witness over vague, partially substantiated hearsay was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

There was no evidence that Lloyd ever discussed outside information with other jurors: Lloyd testified that he did not, and the lawyer’s letter does not allege otherwise. If the trial court was satisfied, based upon Lloyd’s responses and its own observations, that there was no substantial reason to fear that the jury was exposed to prejudicial outside information, then it was well within the trial court’s discretion to end its inquiry.

During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial court overruled defendant’s objections when the prosecutor referred to the murder of the victim as “gruesome” and “brutal.” However, the evidence supported the prosecutor’s assertion that the murder of the 74-year-old woman by tire iron was, in fact, brutal. Further, the challenged remarks related to the state’s theory of the case – that defendant acted intentionally and with premeditation and deliberation – which defendant put directly at issue by claiming he lacked capacity. The brutality of the crime and the infliction of blows after the victim was felled are both circumstances to consider regarding issues of premeditation and deliberation. The trial court acted within its discretion in overruling defendant’s objections.

No error.