North Carolina Lawyers Weekly
Although a panel of this court recently held that a trial court did not need to consider all of the G.S. § 7B-2501(c) factors when entering a dispositional order, we follow prior precedent and hold that the trial court erred when it failed to consider the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the juvenile.
We dismiss the appeal in part, affirm in part, and remand in part.
Motion to Dismiss
Where the juvenile, “Roy,” moved to dismiss at the close of the state’s evidence and then put on his own evidence but failed to renew his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence, he has waived appellate review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
The state’s evidence tended to show Roy encouraged fellow student “Wilson” to pull the fire alarm several times throughout the school day resulting in chaos on school grounds which endangered students. Roy’s actions “[d]isrupt[ed], disturb[ed] [and] interfere[d] with the teaching of students . . . [and] disturb[ed] the peace, order or discipline” at the middle school. G.S. § 14-288.4(6). Moreover, Roy subsequently harassed Wilson about talking with law enforcement.
Where there is sufficient evidence for each element of a criminal offense, manifest injustice cannot exist, and suspension of appellate rules is not justified. We decline to invoke N.C. R. App. 2 and dismiss Roy’s appeal on this issue.
Adjudication Order
The trial court’s adjudication order satisfied G.S. § 7B-2411 because (1) disorderly conduct was identified as the type of offense; (2) June 8, 2016, was listed as the date of the offense; and (3) July 15, 2016, was listed as the date the petition was filed. Additionally, the adjudication order contained delinquency hearing as the type of proceeding, the judge’s signature, and date and proof of filing. The adjudication order also included a description of Roy’s specific conduct, and made the subsequent conclusion of law indicating delinquency. Therefore, the adjudication order had the necessary requirements set forth in G.S. § 7B-2411.
The trial court did, however, make a clerical error by failing to mark the appropriate box in the conclusion of law section of the pre-printed form portion of the order to designate the offense as violent, serious, or minor. We remand for correction of this clerical error.
Disposition
The trial court failed to consider each of the dispositional factors listed in G.S. § 7B-2501(c): “(1) The seriousness of the offense; (2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable; (3) The importance of protecting the public safety; (4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and (5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.”
This court recently held, contrary to precedent, that the trial court does not need to consider all of the § 7B-2501(c) factors when entering a dispositional order. In re D.E.P., 796 S.E.2d 509 (2017) (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-039-17). This inconsistency has created a direct conflict in this court’s prior jurisprudence and must be reconciled.
Where there is a conflicting line of cases, a panel of this court should follow the older of those two lines. Accordingly, In re Ferrell, 162 N.C. App. 175, 589 S.E.2d 894 (2004); In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. 389, 712 S.E.2d 213 (2011); In re K.C., 226 N.C. App. 452, 742 S.E.2d 239; and In re G.C., 230 N.C. App. 511, 750 S.E.2d 548 (2013), are controlling, and we hold that a trial court must consider each of the factors in § 7B-2501(c) when entering a dispositional order.
Here, the trial court erred when it failed to address the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the juvenile. We remand for further findings to address these factors.
Delegation of Authority
Contrary to Roy’s argument, the trial court made the determination that its dispositions were appropriate and did not delegate decisions on whether to enforce them to a third party. Instead, the trial court directed the court counselor and parents to handle the day-to-day implementation of the particular probationary conditions. The trial court exercised its discretion in implementing probationary conditions, and therefore did not impermissibly delegate its authority,
However, the trial court made a clerical error specifying that the probation of 12 months was to terminate on Aug. 10, 2016, instead of Aug. 10, 2017. Accordingly, we remand for this clerical error to be corrected.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded in part.
In re I.W.P. (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-144-18, 19 pp.) (Philip Berger Jr., J.) Appealed from Alexander County District Court (Deborah Brown, J.) Janelle Varley for the state; Amanda Zimmer for defendant. N.C. App.
