Eleven years after she was awarded half of her ex-husband’s IRA, defendant moved for contempt, alleging that plaintiff had failed to transfer her one-half share of the IRA. The trial court correctly ruled that defendant’s contempt motion was barred by G.S. § 1-47(1)’s ten-year statute of limitations applicable to judgments.
We affirm the trial court’s orders.
Defendant is correct that her interest in the IRA vested in October 2008 when the equitable distribution order was entered. However, the issue here pertains to enforceability of the order, by contempt and through N.C. R. Civ. P. 70, eleven years later. Defendant’s interest in the IRA is not what is barred by the statute of limitations and therefore is not at issue here.
Defendant argues that transferring the title of the IRA to her is a ministerial act by the court, and therefore, the court erroneously denied her Rule 70 motion. Rule 70 provides that if a judgment directs a party to perform any specific act and that party fails to comply, the trial court is then authorized “to direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the judge and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the [disobedient] party.”
The trial court correctly ruled that, to enter an order on defendant’s Rule 70 motion, the trial court would be required to make findings that are “beyond a mere ministerial act where no facts are in dispute” and such action is barred by the § 1-47(1) statute of limitations.
Welch v. Welch (Lawyers Weekly No. 012-213-21, 6 pp.) (Fred Gore, J.) Appealed from Guilford County District Court (Marcus Shields & William Davis, JJ.) Samuel Spagnola for plaintiff; Carolyn Woodruff and Jessica Bullock for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-341o