Civil Practice – Involuntary Commitment – Conditional Discharge Revocation – Standard of Proof & Judicial Process

Before revoking the conditional release of an inmate who had been committed due to mental illness, a court must establish a reasoned and logical linkage between the individual’s failure to comply with the conditions of his discharge on the one hand with the finding on the other that “his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.”

Since the district court did not have the benefit of our decision before revoking respondent’s conditional discharge, we vacate the revocation and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal presents two consequential questions related to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. First, we are asked to set the proof standard necessary to support revocation of conditional discharge under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(f). No circuit has exhaustively addressed the question. Second, we consider the process by which the district court should make and support its crucial findings on dangerousness under § 4246(f) (the “dangerousness inquiry” or “risk assessment”).

In § 4246(f), Congress expressed no proof standard.

A § 4246(f) revocation decision will hinge upon the outcome of a hearing, after which the district court must determine “whether the person should be remanded to a suitable facility on the ground that, in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(f). The plain meaning of the text is whether the (1) subject’s “failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment” (2) would result in “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 4246.

Before revoking probation, a court must establish a reasoned and logical linkage between the individual’s failure to comply with the conditions of his discharge on the one hand with the finding on the other that “his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.”

It is not the district court’s obligation to discern and develop the factors, statistical risk predictors, or other factual parameters bearing on this individualized inquiry. Instead, the district court should expect counsel and facility professionals to appropriately develop the matter prior to, and then, if necessary, during the hearing. And if they default, the district court should direct them to drill down and perform their due diligence.

That process did not occur here. First, counsel failed to furnish the district court with a documentary record required for this committee. Second, the district court failed to require more.

Under the standards we establish today, a district court may now revoke conditional discharge upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the individual failed to comply with his treatment regimen, including all conditions reasonably related thereto, and that, in light of that failure, (2) his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.

Vacated and remanded.

Concurrence

(Agee, J.) I write separately because the majority opines at length on matters unnecessary to resolve the case before us and which are not contained in the record.

The district court failed to make any findings connecting respondent’s failure to comply with the conditions of his discharge to a determination that “his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” That is sufficient, in and of itself, to require remand.

United States v. Perkins (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-060-23, 112 pp.) (Volk, J.) (Steven Agee, J., concurring) No. 20-7024. Appealed from USDC at Raleigh, N.C. (Earl Britt, S.J.) Jennifer Claire Leisten and Alan DuBois for appellant; Genna Danelle Petre and Robert Higdon for appellee. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit