Criminal Practice – Murderer’s challenges to death sentence fail

Where Dylan Roof, a white supremacist who pleaded guilty to killing nine members of a Charleston, South Carolina, church, made multiple challenges to his death sentence, including that he lacked competency to stand trial, that it was error to allow self-representation during the penalty phase and that a death verdict should not have been imposed, his arguments had no merit or were unpersuasive and were rejected.

Background

A jury convicted Dylan Roof on nine counts of racially motivated hate crimes resulting in death, three counts of racially motivated hate crimes involving an attempt to kill, nine counts of obstructing religion resulting in death, three counts of obstructing religion involving an attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon and nine counts of use of a firearm to commit murder during and in relation to a crime of violence. The jury unanimously recommended a death sentence on the religious-obstruction and firearm counts, and he was sentenced accordingly.

Competency

Roof argues (1) that the district court erred in finding him competent to stand trial; (2) that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance ahead of the first competency hearing and (3) that the district court abused its discretion by limiting evidence allowed at the second competency hearing. The court disagrees and discerns no merit in Roof’s contentions.

Self-representation

Roof argues that the district court erred in allowing him to represent himself during the penalty phase of his trial. More specifically, he argues: (1) that the Sixth Amendment grants him the right to counsel who will honor his desire to forgo the presentation of mental health mitigation evidence; (2) that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation does not extend to sentencing proceedings and (3) that the Eighth Amendment’s concern with robust capital sentencing procedures demands that all mitigation evidence be presented, either through defense counsel or independent counsel.

In addition to those constitutional arguments, Roof advances four claims of error related to the district court allowing his self-representation. He contends that the court erred by not appropriately informing him of the balance of responsibility between himself and his standby counsel; not appreciating the court’s own discretionary authority to deny for lack of timeliness his motion to represent himself; not correctly assessing whether he was a “gray-area” defendant, meaning that he was competent to stand trial but not competent to represent himself and not allowing standby counsel to take a more active role during jury selection. None of his contentions, constitutionally based or otherwise, has persuasive force.

Death verdict

Roof also asserts that “errors fundamentally undermined [the] weighing process” that jurors used to determine whether the death sentence was justified at the penalty phase. First, Roof argues that the district court erroneously precluded mitigating evidence, that the government capitalized on that error with its improper remarks during closing argument and that the district court’s failure to respond to the jury’s clarification requests exacerbated the government’s errors, ultimately stripping the jury of the necessary means to meaningfully consider certain mitigating factors.

Second, he contends that a victim’s remarks during the guilt phase wrongly influenced the jury’s death verdict. Third, Roof argues that “the government flooded its penalty-phase presentation with improper evidence and argument on the victims’ worthiness,” impermissibly tying its request for a death sentence with the victims’ status as “good and religious people.” And fourth, he asserts that his age and mental capacity rendered him ineligible to receive the death sentence. The court is unpersuaded and finds no error.

Verdict

Roof argues that his convictions for religious obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 247 are invalid under the Commerce Clause; that a conviction pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 247 requires proof of religious hostility; that the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249, is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority; that the Attorney General erroneously certified Roof’s federal prosecution and that Roof’s firearm convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are invalid because the predicate offenses are not categorically crimes of violence. The court disagrees on all points.

Affirmed.

United States v. Roof (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-169-21, 149 pp.) (Per curiam) Case 17-3. Aug. 25, 2021. From D.S.C. (Richard Mark Gergel, J.) Sapna Mirchandani, Margaret Alice-Anne Farrand and Alexandra Wallace Yates for Appellant. Ann O’Connell Adams and Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer for Appellee.