Trusts & Estates — Wills – Patent Ambiguity – ‘Personal Property’ – Specific Bequests & Residuary Beneficiaries

Where (1) a will bequeathed the testator’s “personal property,” including his automobile, to defendant; (2) the will went on to direct that certain personal property—including the testator’s motor vehicles—be sold to fund specific bequests; (3) the will directed that certain funds held by a foundation be transferred to a school; and (4) the will directed that the residue of the estate, including property “real or personal, tangible and intangible” go to the plaintiff-residuary beneficiaries, the will was patently ambiguous.

We affirm the trial court’s determination that the will was patently ambiguous and its construction of the will, transferring the testator’s investment and bank accounts to the residuary beneficiaries.

The words “personal property” are susceptible of two meanings: one, the broader, including all property which is the subject of ownership, except land or interests in land; the other, more restricted, oftentimes embraces only goods and chattels.

The trial court correctly determined that the testator’s (Testator’s) Article III bequest of “all my personal property” to defendant conflicts with other provisions of his will. For instance, subsection (d) of Article III permits the executor “to sell [Testator’s] personal possessions (which have not been listed herein as being devised to [Testator’s] partner, [defendant]).” This authorization suggests that Testator intended that there would be personal possessions that were not otherwise included as part of the bequest to defendant of “all [Testator’s] personal property[.]”

Similarly, Article III also directs the executor to sell “all [Testator’s] remaining personal possessions at the condominium” and to use the net proceeds from these sales to fund specific bequests made in Article V. However, the very existence of “remaining personal possessions at the condominium” is incompatible with a bequest of “all [Testator’s] personal property” to defendant.

In addition, the provisions of Article V, subsection (l) are unquestionably inconsistent with the provisions of Article III bequeathing all of Testator’s personal property to defendant. Subsection (l) expressly requires the sale of “any motor vehicles [Testator] may own at the time of [Testator’s] demise” and specifically directs that the net-sales proceeds be distributed to the University of North Carolina School of the Arts, while “[Testator’s] automobile” was left to defendant in Article III.

The trial court did not err in concluding that the will contained a patent ambiguity in the various provisions regarding Testator’s “personal property.”

The trial court’s thorough analysis reflects an examination of Testator’s intent that squares the initial bequest of all of Testator’s personal property, and the repeated conflicting bequests of Testator’s personal property thereafter, with Testator’s evident intent to leave certain intangible property, which the trial court determined included the contested bank and investment accounts, to plaintiffs. After careful review of the trial court’s analysis, we conclude that the trial court properly resolved the discord created by the patent ambiguity in light of the prevailing purpose of the entire instrument.

Affirmed.

Treadaway v. Payne (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-197-21, 14 pp.) (Valerie Zachary, J.) Appealed from Forsyth County Superior Court (David Hall, J.) William Walker for plaintiffs; Stuart Brooks for defendant. 2021-NCCOA-535