Criminal Practice — Stand Your Ground – Common Law Supplanted – Commission of Felony – Causal Nexus

Although not expressly stated, the General Assembly’s intent to abolish the common law right to perfect self-defense—via the enactment of the Stand Your Ground statutes—is unmistakable. Because there was no casual nexus between (1) defendant’s violation of the law against a felon possessing a gun and (2) his invocation of the protection of the Stand Your Ground statutes, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that defendant would not be entitled to invoke the Stand Your Ground statutes if he were in the process of committing the felony of being a felon in possession of a handgun. However, defendant cannot show prejudice because the jury found that he not only killed his attacker, but also committed armed robbery during the encounter.

We modify and affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding defendant’s murder conviction.

Common Law Supplanted

G.S. § 14-51.3 closely tracks the common law definition of the right to self-defense. This statute lacks a “carve out” explicitly conveying the General Assembly’s intention to preserve the common law. Together, these facts indicate that the General Assembly meant to replace the existing common law right to perfect self-defense with a new statutory right.

Causal Nexus

G.S. § 14-51.4 says “The justification described in G.S. 14-51.2 and G.S. 14-51.3 is not available to a person who used defensive force and who … was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony.” A literal interpretation of § 14-51.4(1) would produce absurd consequences inconsistent with the General Assembly’s manifest purpose of making self-defense more widely available as a justification for the use of force.

At common law, no group of defendants was categorically prohibited from invoking the right to self-defense. A defendant was prohibited from invoking self-defense only if it was in some sense the defendant’s “fault” that the confrontation occurred.

If we adopted the state’s proposed interpretation, a woman in possession of a little more than one and a half ounces of marijuana, a felony in North Carolina, could not rely on self-defense to justify the use of defensive force if her abusive boyfriend, for reasons unrelated to her marijuana possession, began to beat and threaten to kill her.

It is doubtful that the General Assembly intended to completely disavow a fundamental common law principle in a statute which otherwise closely hews to the common law.

We hold that in order to disqualify a defendant from justifying the use of force as self-defense pursuant to § 14-51.4(1), the state must introduce evidence that “but for the defendant” attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony, the confrontation resulting in injury to the victim would not have occurred. Here, the trial court did not instruct the jury on this causal nexus requirement. Therefore, the jury instructions it delivered were erroneous.

No Prejudice

The jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony—other than possession of a firearm by a felon—when he shot the man who allegedly attacked him: robbery with a dangerous weapon.

Because one of the elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon was defendant’s use or threatened use of a firearm, the jury finding defendant guilty of this offense meant that the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s felonious conduct was immediately causally connected to the circumstances giving rise to his shooting the decedent. Based upon the outcome of defendant’s trial, it is indisputable that there existed an immediate causal nexus between his felonious conduct and the confrontation during which he used assertedly defensive force, and the felony disqualifier applies to bar his claim of self-defense.

Because the state did prove to the jury’s satisfaction that defendant committed the felony offense of robbery with a deadly weapon, and based on the uncontroverted facts, defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction.

Modified and affirmed.

Concurrence

(Newby, C.J.): I agree with the majority’s determination that §§ 14-51.3 and 14-51.4 supplant the common law with respect to perfect self-defense. However, because defendant failed to preserve his causal nexus argument for appellate review, this court should not address it. Further, even if defendant did preserve his causal nexus argument, § 14-51.4 does not require the state to prove a causal nexus between a defendant’s commission of a felony and his use of self-defense. Therefore, I do not join the portion of the majority’s opinion that places a causal nexus element into § 14-51.4.

State v. McLymore (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-011-22, 29 pp.) (Anita Earls, J.) (Paul Newby, C.J., joined by Tamara Barringer, J., concurring in the result) (Philip Berger, J., not participating) Appealed from Cumberland County Superior Court (Claire Hill, J.) On discretionary review from the Court of Appeals. Marc Sneed for the state; Sterling Rozear for defendant. 2022-NCSC-12