Criminal Practice – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Ex Mero Motu – Jury Instructions – Stand Your Ground Laws

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and accordingly, we dismiss both of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Further, we conclude the trial court neither erred nor plainly erred by deciding to instruct the jury on the aggressor doctrine but not stand your ground laws. Finally, we hold the trial court did not err when it neglected to intervene in the State’s closing argument.

There is no error.

Defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court erred in its jury instructions, and the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu in the State’s closing argument. We disagree.

First, defendant asserted he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney conceded defendant’s guilt prior to obtaining defendant’s consent, and undermined defendant’s testimony during closing arguments. We hold these arguments lack merit and accordingly, conclude there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, and the transcript revealed his counsel advocating for the jury to find defendant either not guilty, or guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Those statements did not render his assistance ineffective. Second, defendant argued his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by directly undermining defendant’s testimony in closing argument. The statements made by defense counsel, however, do not rise to the level of being “incoherent” or lacking any “positive advocacy.”

Next, defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on stand your ground laws and by instructing the jury on the aggressor doctrine. Enough facts that jury instructions regarding the aggressor doctrine were warranted, and instructions on stand your ground laws were not.

Finally, defendant asserted the trial court erred when it failed to intervene ex mero motu in the State’s closing argument. Defendant argued “[i]t was plainly and grossly improper for the [State] to argue that the jury should not convict [him] of voluntary manslaughter because the sentence he might receive would not be sufficiently severe.” While suggesting that the minimum sentence would not be severe enough punishment might run afoul of the unspoken rules of courtroom etiquette, it is not, in fact, against the law. Counselors have the right to inform the jury of the punishments prescribed, and here, counsel for both defendant and the State made clear what the minimum and maximum sentences could be. For that reason, we conclude the trial court did not err when it failed to intervene during the State’s closing argument.

No error.

State v. Parker (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-184-23, 14 pp.) (Julee Flood, J.) Appealed from Gates County Superior Court (Wayland J. Sermons Jr., J.) Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert C. Montgomery for the State; Sarah Holladay, for defendant-appellant. North Carolina Court of Appeals