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Criminal Practice – Reasonable Suspicion – Motion to Suppress – Traffic Stop – Controlled Substance – Possession

Criminal Practice – Reasonable Suspicion – Motion to Suppress – Traffic Stop – Controlled Substance – Possession

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The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. To the extent defendant challenged the trial court’s findings of fact, they were adequately supported by competent evidence, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support the challenged conclusion of law, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress and determining that the traffic stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged.

We held no error.

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of trafficking heroin by possession, trafficking heroin by transport, possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and resisting a public officer. At sentencing, defendant admitted his habitual felon status.

Defendant presented two issues on appeal: whether the trial court made findings of fact to support its conclusion of law that the stop was lawfully extended, and whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

Defendant argued that the court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion of law that the traffic stop was not unconstitutionally prolonged. Our de novo review examining the constitutionality of the traffic stop’s extension showed that the challenged legal conclusion was adequately supported by the findings of fact.

The question before us required not a determination of probable cause but consideration of whether the sight or smell of marijuana meets the less demanding standard of reasonable suspicion, required to extend the traffic stop beyond the length of time that is reasonably necessary to accomplish its mission. The applicable drug statute states, in relevant part: “Except as authorized . . . it is unlawful for any person . . . [t]o possess a controlled substance.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 (2023). And marijuana remains a controlled substance under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-94 (2023). In contrast to the impaired driving case, the trial court’s order contains findings of fact that address all elements of the alleged crime.

Our de novo review of this matter lead us to conclude the traffic stop was not unlawfully extended, and the court did not err in concluding the same. There was at least “a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch” of completed criminal activity—possession of marijuana. We held that the stop of defendant was not extended in contravention of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

No error.

State v. George (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-051-24, 14 pp.) (Michael Stading, J.) Appealed from Sampson County Superior Court (Henry L. Stevens, J.) Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jessica Macari, for the State; Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katherine Jane Allen, for the defendant-appellant. North Carolina Court of Appeals

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