Indictment valid with ‘essential elements’ of crime

An indictment is valid if it alleges facts to support the essential elements of the crime with which a defendant is charged, such that the defendant has sufficient notice to prepare a defense, the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled.

The victim celebrated her birthday on Jan. 17, 2016, in Charlotte with two friends. The trio went to brunch before driving to Zen Massage, where the victim was scheduled for a deep tissue massage.

She undressed to her underwear and laid face down on the table. A massage therapist, Eric Stewart, began massaging her back and shoulders. He then asked the victim to turn over.

As Stewart massaged the inside of her thighs, the victim felt his pinky finger “kind of graze the fabric of [her] panties.” She said nothing, believing it was an accident.

Moments later, however, Stewart digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina three times.

The victim did not consent to the penetrations, and Stewart did not say anything.

Shocked by the incident, the victim described herself as “frozen.” Stewart acted like nothing happened.

The victim told her friends about the incident when they got in the car. She called the police and made an official statement.

On April 11, 2016, Stewart was indicted on one count of second-degree forcible sexual offense and one count of sexual battery. Regarding the sexual battery offense, the indictment cited N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5A and read:

“[O]n or about the 17th day of January, 2016, in Mecklenburg County, [Stewart], did unlawfully and willfully for the purpose of sexual arousal, engage in sexual contact with another person, [the victim], without her consent.”

Stewart pleaded not guilty. He did not object to the language of the indictment at trial, challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction or argue that the indictment failed to put him on notice of the charged offense or protect him from double jeopardy.

A jury found Stewart guilty of sexual battery and not guilty of second-degree forcible sexual offense.

Stewart appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual battery charge because the indictment omitted an essential element of the offense — that the act was committed “by force.”

The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the indictment invalid. The state appealed.

In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Paul Newby, the state’s highest court reversed.

“[S]o long as a crime against the laws and people of this State has been alleged, defects in indictments do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction,” he wrote. “A defendant challenging an indictment as defective must show that the indictment contained a statutory or constitutional defect and that such error was prejudicial.”

Considering whether the indictment against Stewart, which failed to allege the act was committed “by force,” the court found it was not flawed so as to constitute error.

Indictments do not bind the hands of the state with technical rules of pleading, as it would not favor justice to allow a defendant to escape merited punishment upon a minor matter of form, the court said.

“Taken together with the purpose of an indictment ‘to put the defendant on notice of the crime being charged and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy,’ a test for indictment validity becomes ‘whether the indictment alleges facts supporting the essential elements of the offense to be charged,’” the court wrote.

Implicit in the language of Stewart’s indictment “is the fact that [he] committed sexual acts upon the victim by force, however slight,” the court said. “Nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies that the contact was committed by the use of some degree of force and against the will of the victim. The element of force is inferable from the language of the indictment such that a person of common understanding might know what was intended.”

Additionally, the indictment stated the charge against Stewart in a plain, intelligible and explicit manner, citing the statute under which he was charged, which placed him on notice of the charge against him, allowing him to prepare for trial and protecting him from double jeopardy, the court pointed out. Nor did Stewart object to the language of the indictment or allege that it failed to put him on notice of the charged offense.

“[Stewart’s] argument here represents a regression to the era of technical pleading rules from which this State’s jurisprudence has long since departed,” the court added. “As this Court has written time and again, such rules tend to emphasize form over substance, undermining justice. We hold that the indictment here is facially valid, having sufficiently alleged facts to place defendant on notice of the charge against him.”

Justice Anita Earls filed an opinion, joined by Justice Allison Riggs, concurring.

Assistant Attorney General Zachary K. Dunn represented the state; the Office of the Attorney General declined to comment.

Assistant Appellate Defender Sterling Rozear, who represented Stewart, did not respond to a request for comment.

The case is State v. Stewart, No. 23PA22.