4th Circuit: Outburst gave judge right to change defendant’s sentence

In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals joined other circuits in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 does not deprive the District Court of authority to alter a sentence during the course of the same hearing. Rather, a sentence becomes final and binding for § 3582 purposes only once (1) it has been “unequivocally state[d]” in open court and (2) there has been a “formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished.”

Background

In March 2021, Gilbert Devon Melvin was released from federal prison and began a five-year term of supervised release. In August 2023, Melvin was arrested for trespassing. At the revocation hearing that followed, the District Court initially agreed to terminate Melvin’s supervised release and enter a time-served sentence.

But before the hearing concluded, Melvin engaged in what the court viewed as “one of the worst outbursts [it had] ever seen in an open courtroom.” The District Court immediately concluded that Melvin’s outburst indicated he posed a danger to the public and to his probation officers. Accordingly, the court withdrew its initial agreement to a time-served sentence and instead elected to maintain Melvin’s supervised release with an additional mental health condition.

Analysis

Federal law places paramount importance on the finality of criminal proceedings, and permits courts to modify sentences only in limited circumstances. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, a court generally may not modify a sentence “once it has been imposed.” Thus, “[w]hen the district court unequivocally states a sentence and then imposes it, and the sentence is not the product of error, the district court has no authority to alter that sentence.”

This court has “not precisely defined when a sentence is orally imposed during a sentencing hearing.” Other circuits have embraced a pragmatic rule, holding that § 3582(c) does not “deprive the district court of [authority] to alter a sentence during the course of the same hearing.” Under this approach, a sentence announced in open court is not “imposed” until there has been a “formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing [has] finished.”

This approach aligns with this court’s caselaw. Because “sentencing is a fluid and dynamic process,” it has hesitated to bind courts to statements made before a sentencing hearing has concluded. Treating a sentence as tentative until sentencing has concluded “provides the district court with an opportunity to correct [any potential] errors before, and perhaps in lieu of, appellate review.”

Equally important, the defendant’s behavior after the initial announcement of the sentence can reveal new information highly relevant to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors. For this reason, other circuits have permitted courts to adjust a sentence in response to the defendant’s statements or conduct before the sentencing hearing has concluded.

Here, immediately after the district judge indicated that he would agree to a time-served sentence, Melvin engaged in a five-minute diatribe that he himself describes as a “stream-of-consciousness outburst” and an “emotional word salad.” The court regarded that statement as “one of the worst outbursts [it had] ever seen in an open courtroom,” leading it to believe that Melvin was “a danger to the law and to law enforcement.” These concerns are highly relevant to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, which direct sentencing courts to consider “the history and characteristics of the defendant”; the need “to protect the public” and the need “to provide the defendant with … medical care.”

Accordingly, this court joins other circuits in holding that § 3582 does not “deprive the district court of [authority] to alter a sentence during the course of the same hearing.” Rather, a sentence becomes final and binding for § 3582 purposes only once (1) it has been “unequivocally state[d]” in open court and (2) there has been a “formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished.”

Melvin maintains that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure compels this court to hold that a sentence is imposed the moment it is uttered. But nowhere does Rule 35 define when a sentence is “imposed” for § 3582 purposes — much less mandate that a sentence is imposed the moment it is uttered. The history of Rule 35 confirms as much. Because the district court here could not “logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished” before Melvin’s outburst, the District Court did not violate § 3582 by retracting its initial agreement to a time-served sentence.

Affirmed.

United States v. Melvin, Case No. 23-4618, June 26, 2024. 4th Cir. (Motz), from EDNC at Raleigh (Boyle). Jennifer Claire Leisten for Appellant. Charles Edward Loeser for Appellee. 13 pp.