4th Circuit: United States dismissed from wrongful death suit

Where a member of the U.S. Marine Corps murdered his grandmother, but there was no jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the suit was dismissed.

Background

This case arises out of the events surrounding the murder of Sallie Copeland Evans by her grandson, Isaiah Evans Ceasar, a member of the United States Marine Corps. The executor of Sallie’s estate, her son, Garnet Evans, who also was Ceasar’s uncle, filed a timely complaint in federal court pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, or FTCA, asserting a claim for wrongful death under North Carolina law.

Under Sheridan v. United States (487 U.S. 392 (1988)), whether Evans’s claim is permitted or prohibited under the FTCA depends on whether the intentional tort exception applies and thus whether Ceasar’s commander, Capt. Smith, was negligent on a basis unrelated to Ceasar’s employment with the Marine Corps.

The government, which characterizes Evans’s claim as one “for injury resulting from murder,” maintains that the intentional tort exception bars Evans’s claim. In contrast, Evans contends that the intentional tort exception is inapplicable because Sallie’s death resulted from two tortious acts — Ceasar’s shooting and Capt. Smith’s negligence — and he seeks to impose liability on the government for only the latter.

The district court dismissed Evans’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Analysis

Where a defendant challenges the factual predicate of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court need not assume the truth of the allegations, may decide disputed issues of fact and may venture outside of the pleadings to resolve the challenge. Considering the standard and the array of evidence the district may review under it, this court cannot assume on appeal that the district court assessed the merits in making a jurisdictional determination following a factual challenge.

This is especially so at the motion to dismiss stage where, on the merits, the district court must limit its consideration to the pleadings and accept the facts as true. Accordingly, as a court of review, this court refrains from assessing the merits under these circumstances and remands for the district court to conduct the appropriate analysis in the first instance.

The same concerns regarding the district court’s assessment of the merits are not present in the context of facial challenges. Under a facial challenge, where the defendant contends that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court assesses the motion under the same standard as one brought under Rule 12(b)(6).

Here, whether Capt. Smith was legally negligent is determinative of whether federal courts have jurisdiction over this case. The facts essential to determining jurisdiction and assessing the merits of Evans’s claim are therefore inextricably intertwined and the district court erred in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(1).

However, the government also facially challenged subject-matter jurisdiction, which is analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States may only be held liable for negligence under the FTCA if an individual could be held liable for the same actions under the law of the state where the alleged negligence occurred. In North Carolina, an individual may expose himself to negligence liability by assisting or attempting to assist another person when he does not have an obligation to do so.

However, given the absence of any facts alleging that Capt. Smith acted to assist or benefit Sallie, Evans cannot state a claim premised on a voluntary undertaking. And to the extent Evans’s claim is predicated on a special relationship between the Marine Corps and Ceasar, the claim still fails.

Moreover, even if Capt. Smith had voluntarily undertaken a duty to Sallie or the Marine Corps had a special relationship with Ceasar, “[n]o legal duty exists unless the injury to the plaintiff [or decedent] was foreseeable and avoidable through due care.” Accepting the facts as pleaded here, this court cannot conclude that Sallie’s death was foreseeable under the circumstances.

Affirmed.

Concurring opinion

Quattlebaum, J., concurring in judgment:

I agree with much of the majority opinion. But to me, a recent Supreme Court opinion, Brownback v. King (592 U.S. 209 (2021)), requires us to affirm regardless of whether the district court treated the dismissal as one under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).

Evans v. United States, Case No. 22-2022, June 24, 2024. 4th Cir. (Gregory), from EDNC at Greenville (Flanagan). Walton Everett Lupton for Appellant. Sharon Coull Wilson and Madison Dunbar for Appellee. 23 pp.