4th Circuit: Court may consider video at motion to dismiss stage

In a case of first impression, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a District Court can consider a video submitted at the motion to dismiss stage when (1) the video is “integral” to the complaint and its authenticity is not challenged, but (2) only to the extent that the video “clearly depicts a set of facts contrary to those alleged in the complaint,” or “blatantly contradicts” the plaintiff’s allegations, rendering the plaintiff’s allegations implausible.

Background

Nasanto Antonio Crenshaw, age 17, was shot and killed by Matthew Sletten, a Greensboro police officer who was trying to stop an allegedly stolen car that Crenshaw was driving. Crenshaw’s mother filed suit against the officer, alleging a claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various North Carolina state law claims. She also named as a defendant the City of Greensboro, asserting the same state law claims.

The city filed a motion to dismiss, arguing it was immune from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity and had not waived that immunity. The District Court agreed and dismissed all claims against the city.

The District Court also granted Sletten’s motion to dismiss after viewing a video recording of the encounter. Contrary to the plaintiff’s allegations in her amended complaint, the court found based on the video that the stolen car driven by Crenshaw in a parking lot “was moving directly towards” the officer. It held that Sletten therefore was justified in firing one shot through the car’s front windshield and other shots through the car’s right passenger window.

City

Under state law, municipalities generally are entitled to governmental immunity for state law tort claims based on the conduct of the municipality’s employees while performing a governmental function. Such immunity can be “waived” when the municipality is indemnified by an insurance policy.

Here, the city “presented uncontroverted evidence that it does not have liability insurance” that would cover the plaintiff’s claims alleged against the city. The court thus agrees with the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s state law claims against the city on the basis of governmental immunity.

But while the District Court correctly chose to dismiss those claims, it erred by doing so under Rule 12(b)(2). So, the District Court should have granted the city’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), not 12(b)(2). Because the District Court’s procedural mechanism did not alter its final disposition, its dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the city is affirmed.

Setten

This court has not previously addressed in a published decision whether and in what manner a trial court may consider a video recording at the motion to dismiss stage. But it has explained that when a District Court considers a video recording of a police encounter at the summary judgment stage, a court must credit the plaintiff’s version of the facts to the extent they are not “blatantly contradicted” by the recording.

In agreement with other circuits, the court now concludes that the same standard applies to a trial court’s consideration of a video recording at the motion to dismiss stage Accordingly, a District Court can consider a video submitted at the motion to dismiss stage when (1) the video is “integral” to the complaint and its authenticity is not challenged, but (2) only to the extent that the video “clearly depicts a set of facts contrary to those alleged in the complaint,” or “blatantly contradicts” the plaintiff’s allegations, rendering the plaintiff’s allegations implausible.

Here, the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a plausible claim of excessive force. Because the video recording did not blatantly contradict the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the location of the officer and the trajectory of the moving car at the time each shot was fired, the District Court erred in construing the facts in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff’s allegations.

Based on the plaintiff’s allegations, a reasonable officer in Sletten’s position would not think that the stolen car, which was moving away from the officer, posed a significant and immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer that would justify his conduct of firing one shot through the car’s windshield and additional shots through the car’s passenger window.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Doriety v. Sletten, case no. 23-1867, July 29, 2024. 4th Cir. (Keenan), from MDNC at Greensboro (Eagles). Harry Martina Daniels Jr. for Appellant. Patrick Michael Kane for Appellees. 18 pp.