Criminal Practice – Intentional Child Abuse Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury – Felony-Murder Rule

The trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder and intentional child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury, nor did the trial court commit plain error by allowing the State to present the testimony of Defendant’s fellow inmate.

Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.

Defendant appealed from judgments entered upon a jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree murder of his infant son, “Dylan,” and intentional child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury of Dylan’s twin brother, “Daniel.” On appeal, Defendant first contended the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder (as to Dylan), and intentional child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury (as to Daniel), because the State’s evidence was insufficient to submit either charge to the jury. Defendant further argued “that the trial court committed plain error” by allowing the State to present the testimony of fellow inmate Brandon Woods , because the evidence “was ‘inherently incredible’ pursuant to State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 154 S.E.2d 902 (1967)”; and Woods was acting “as an agent of the State” when he unlawfully “interrogated” Defendant in jail, in violation of his constitutional rights.

The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant committed intentional child abuse inflicting serious bodily injury with regard to both twins, and that Dylan died as a result. Further, notwithstanding Defendant’s assertions otherwise, the State’s evidence was more than sufficient to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. Among other things, the State established that Defendant’s story changed numerous times, which the jury could infer as a sign of his dishonesty, or even guilt. And because the State also presented substantial evidence that Dylan’s death resulted from felonious child abuse with the use of a deadly weapon (i.e., Defendant’s hands), the court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder of Dylan. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss both charges.

Defendant’s final argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present the testimony of Woods because the evidence was “inherently incredible”; and its admission violated Defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Defendant’s challenge to Woods’s testimony does not concern “inherently incredible” observations but rather the type of witness-credibility determinations that jurors are called upon to make in nearly every trial. Defendant therefore failed to show that the trial court’s admission of this testimony constituted error, much less plain error.

Defendant last argued that the trial court erred by admitting Woods’s testimony because Woods was acting “as an agent of the State who interrogated [Defendant] on behalf of the State in violation of [D]efendant’s rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” However, Defendant did not object to the admission of Woods’s testimony—on constitutional grounds or otherwise—and therefore, he waived appellate review of this issue.

No error.

State of North Carolina v. Robert Ahmaad Middleton Jr. (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-347-25, 20 pp.) (Valerie Zachary, J.) Appealed from Gaston County Superior Court (William R. Bell, J.) Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Heidi M. Williams, for the State; William D. Spence for defendant-appellant. North Carolina Court of Appeals