Criminal Practice – Jury Selection – Prospective Alternate Jurors

The trial court did not err by filling Juror No. 7’s seat with someone from the jury venire rather than one of the prospective alternate jurors.

We discerned no error.

Defendant appealed from final judgments entered against him pursuant to jury verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was also found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon; however, the trial court arrested judgment on this conviction at sentencing. Defendant asserted a single issue for appeal: whether the trial court committed error by filling Juror No. 7’s (Mr. Stolz’s) seat with someone from the jury venire rather than one of the prospective alternate jurors. He maintained the trial court’s decision contravenes N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1215(a) (2023) and amounts to error per se or structural error. We disagreed.

Latching onto the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1215(a)—“any time prior to a verdict being rendered, any juror dies, becomes incapacitated or disqualified, or is discharged for any other reason, an alternate juror becomes a juror”—Defendant claimed that the trial court erred in selecting someone from the jury venire to replace Mr. Stolz, rather than seating one of the prospective alternate jurors. Defendant claimed this subsection is effective after the “initial twelve jurors have been selected.” Stated another way, Defendant proffered that the duties of an alternate juror are triggered before the jury is empaneled. This necessarily presents a novel argument for our consideration: whether those prospective, yet-to-be members of the to-be-empaneled jury who have been accepted by each party, are properly classified as jurors or alternate jurors.

The criminal jury selection statutes do not offer a precise definition of “juror” or “alternate juror.” We therefore considered the plain meaning of “juror” or “alternate juror” in view of Article 72. The term “juror” “should be distinguished from potential juror or veniremember.” “The difference is that a potential juror or veniremember hasn’t yet been selected to sit on the jury . . . a juror is someone who has been empaneled on the jury.” Id. It follows that a plain-meaning analysis disfavors Defendant’s urged position because an alternate juror does not become so until empaneled. This definitional analysis accords with the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(g).

Defendant also disputed the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(g), as he maintains that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1215(a) is controlling. Subsection 15A-1214(g) discusses discovered concerns regarding a prospective juror amounting to a basis for a challenge for cause after a juror has been accepted, but not yet empaneled. While the circumstances presented here are unique, this subsection applies since it squarely addresses scenarios within the procedural posture of the present matter and provides the proper course of action. See id. (“any time after a juror has been accepted . . . and before the jury is impaneled”; “[a]ny replacement juror called is subject to examination, challenge for cause, and peremptory challenge as any other unaccepted juror.”). A trial court judge is permitted to “excuse a juror without challenge by either party if he determines that grounds for challenge for cause are present.” The trial court did not explicitly state he was exercising his statutory authority to challenge this juror for cause, but the record makes that determination readily apparent. In its effort to resolve this quandary, the trial court followed the protocol provided in subsection 15A-1214(g)—he called a replacement juror from the jury venire, and they were “subject to examination, challenge for cause, and peremptory challenge as any other unaccepted juror.” In any event, nothing about Defendant’s contention shows that he was prejudiced against having a competent, fair, and impartial jury. In fact, in his brief, Defendant does not address prejudice, instead he asserts that the applicable standard of review does not require a showing of prejudice. To that end, Defendant argued that the violation was error per se or structural error. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, our relevant jurisprudence—citing statutory error—does not allow us to dispense of the prejudice prong. Since Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, his contentions as to statutory error are overruled.

No error.

State of North Carolina v. Jamaal Griffin (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-049-25, 15 pp.) (Michael Stading, J.) Appealed from Mecklenburg County Superior Court (Patrick Thomas Nadolski, J.) Carolina Appeal, by Attorney Drew Nelson, for the defendant-appellant; Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Caden W. Hayes, for the State. North Carolina Court of Appeals