Civil Rights – Federal Tort Claims Act – Bivens Appeal

Entry of judgment on Plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim “bars” his Bivens appeal.

We dismissed the appeal.

A federal inmate alleging abuse by Federal Bureau of Prison (FBOP) officials, Plaintiff Longworth filed two separate lawsuits: the first presented a Bivens claim directly against those officials, and the second an FTCA claim against the U.S. The district court dismissed both claims, and Longworth appealed only the Bivens dismissal. The question before us was whether the entry of judgment on Longworth’s FTCA claim “bars” his Bivens appeal. We concluded that it does.

Justin Longworth was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina from July 22, 2016, until January 16, 2019. Longworth claimed that while there he faced repeated sexual harassment and abuse. Specifically, Longworth alleged that during his work assignment as a plumber, he came into frequent contact with Defendant Sherry M. Beck, an FBOP correctional officer. Longworth claimed Beck took an inappropriate interest in him and engaged in daily aggressive sexual harassment and abuse including forced oral sex, fondling and groping of the genitals, kissing, and biting. According to Longworth, Defendants Andrew Mansukhani (warden of FCI-Butner Medium), Anthony T. Scarantino (correctional institution administrator at FCI-Butner), Patrick Burrell (plumber for the FCI-Butner facilities department), and Matthew W. Haught (maintenance mechanic for the FCI-Butner facilities department) initially did nothing to stop or report Beck’s abuse. Eventually, Haught reported Beck to her facilities supervisors, but failed to report the conduct to his own supervisors, a Special Investigative Agent, or the wardens (Defendants Mansukhani and Scarantino) as required by prison policy. Longworth was then fired from his work assignment and placed in solitary confinement. After Longworth was moved to solitary confinement, he decided to report Beck’s conduct to Special Investigative Agent Sean Kearney. Following this report, an investigation ensued, Beck was terminated, and Longworth was transferred to a low security Federal Correctional Institution in Petersburg, Virginia. But neither Longworth’s transfer nor Beck’s termination abated the misconduct—Longworth claimed Beck continued to harass him at FCI Petersburg Low by sending him sexually explicit and threatening letters.

In 2019, Longworth commenced this action asserting claims for violations of his civil rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and related state law claims. Longworth alleged Beck sexually assaulted him in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, and that the remaining Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On November 11, 2021, Longworth noticed this appeal. But prior to Longworth’s appeal (and even prior to the district court’s Bivens dismissal order), Longworth filed a separate complaint, on August 16, 2021, under the FTCA, alleging the United States was liable for its employees’ negligence. Longworth’s FTCA complaint alleged the same underlying facts as his Bivens complaint. On September 29, 2022, the district court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding Longworth had not adequately pleaded that Beck was acting within her scope of employment during the alleged misconduct (one of the six elements required to bring a meritorious FTCA claim). Longworth did not appeal the judgment on his FTCA claim.

The question facing the Court was whether the district court’s FTCA judgment precludes this Bivens appeal. The FTCA judgment bar provides that an FTCA judgment is a “complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” This Court specifically asked the parties to address whether the FTCA’s judgment bar applies retroactively. The Court need not resolve that question because there is nothing “retroactive” about the judgment bar’s effect on this case. The FTCA judgment bar “preclude[s] a Bivens claim against a government employee when a judgment has been entered on an FTCA claim arising out of the same actions, transactions, or occurrences as the Bivens claim.” That is what we have here. A judgment (on the merits) has been entered regarding Longworth’s FTCA claim, but Longworth wished to continue to pursue his Bivens claim. Because that claim is based on the same actions as his FTCA claim, however, it is now precluded. Longworth urged this Court to interpret the text of § 2676 “to apply solely to actions filed after or contemporaneous with the FTCA action, not appeals of separate, earlier-filed actions.” In Longworth’s view, application of the judgment bar to this matter implicates retroactivity because the Bivens suit was filed first. We disagreed. There is nothing “retroactive” about application of the FTCA judgment bar here. Longworth’s Bivens claim (whether or not it was filed first) is still on appeal. It therefore remains an “action” that is subject to the bar.

Dismissed.

Longworth v. Mansukhani (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 001-109-25, 9 pp.) (Michael S. Nachmanoff, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh (Louise W. Flanagan, J.) Argued: Thomas Ross Brugato, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant; Jonathan Silberman, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina; Frederick C. Kieser, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. On Brief: Samuel Weiss, Oren Nimni, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, D.C.; David M. Zionts, Matthew Quallen, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, Sharon C. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, for Appellees; J. Scott Ballenger, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee Sherry M. Beck. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit