SCOTUS wrap-up: factors for revoking supervised release narrowed

A federal judge could not consider the need to “promote respect for the law” in deciding whether to revoke a drug defendant’s supervised release, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 7-2 in reversing a decision from the 6th Circuit and resolving a circuit split.

A federal judge in Ohio sentenced defendant Edgardo Esteras to 12 months in prison followed by a 6-year term of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin. While on supervised release, the defendant was arrested and charged with domestic violence and other crimes.

The judge who handed down the original sentence revoked the defendant’s supervised release and ordered 24 months of reimprisonment. The judge reasoned that her original sentence had been “rather lenient” and that the defendant’s revocation sentence must “promote respect for the law,” which is one of 8 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(A)’s general factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.

The 6th Circuit affirmed, holding that a district court may consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release.

Click here to read the full text of the June 20 decision in Esteras v. United States.

BULLET POINTS: “Supervised release comes with conditions — for instance, the defendant must refrain from committing another crime. §3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only ‘after considering’ an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those ‘set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).’ Conspicuously missing from this list is §3553(a)(2)(A),which directs a district court to consider ‘the need for the sentence imposed’ ‘to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.’ The Sixth Circuit held that a district court may consider that factor nonetheless.

“We disagree. Congress’s decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting §3553(a)(2)(A) raises a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release. This inference is consistent with both the statutory structure and the role that supervised release plays in the sentencing process.”

— Justice Amy Coney Barrett, opinion of the court

“Because the majority frames the question as one about retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exacting retribution for the defendant’s supervised-release violation. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward. As the Court holds today, the supervised-release statute does not permit consideration of §3553(a)(2)(A). That means courts may consider only the remaining eight enumerated factors, none of which contain any reference to retribution. See §3583(e). As the majority recognizes, moreover, the retributive interest in punishment is ill suited to supervised-release proceedings. Supervised release ‘“fulfills rehabilitative ends” and “provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.”’ Thus, ‘when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.’”

— Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

“The question presented in this litigation is whether sentencing courts can reference and rely upon the retributive concerns outlined in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a previously imposed term of supervised release. ‘Esteras argues that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose articulated in §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release,’ while ‘[t]he Government insists that courts can consider it, although they are not required to do so.’ Like the Court, I agree with Esteras: Courts cannot consider this omitted sentencing purpose when revoking supervised release.

“That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has taken off the table. Venturing into this territory is not necessary in the context of this litigation.”

— Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

“Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings. Today’s decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit A in the trial bench’s catalog of appellate otherworldliness.The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that a federal district court judge, when considering whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in mind-bending exercises. The judge must take into account ‘the nature and circumstances’ of a defendant’s offense but is forbidden to consider ‘the seriousness of the offense.’ The judge must consider what is needed to ‘dete[r]’ violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defendant, i.e., to cause him to lead a law-abiding life, but cannot be influenced by a desire ‘to promote respect for the law.’

“The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the interpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure of the Act supports the Court’s interpretation.”

— Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., joined by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, dissenting