Attorneys – North Carolina State Bar – Disciplinary Jurisdiction

North Carolina General Statute Section 84-28 limits the Disciplinary Hearing Commission’s disciplinary jurisdiction to attorneys admitted to practice in North Carolina.

The Court reversed the DHC’s Order of Discipline and Order on Motion for Relief.

Defendant is an attorney licensed by the State of New York who practices in the federal immigration court in North Carolina, but he is not and has never been admitted to practice in the North Carolina courts. Defendant lives in North Carolina, maintains a law office in Charlotte, North Carolina, and represents clients in the federal immigration court in Charlotte. His practice is limited to federal immigration law and Defendant does not appear in North Carolina state courts, although his clientele in the immigration court “regularly included North Carolina clients.”

In 2017, Bank of America sent the State Bar notices of insufficient funds in Defendant’s trust account. The notices of insufficient funds resulted from Defendant’s misappropriation of funds during his representation of two clients, both North Carolina residents. Ultimately, the State Bar opened a grievance against Defendant. In 2022, the State Bar filed a complaint against Defendant with the DHC, alleging Defendant failed to respond to its grievance and requested Defendant be disciplined by the DHC under North Carolina General Statute Section 84-28. Defendant did not respond to the complaint and the State Bar eventually “moved for entry of default against [Defendant], which [the DHC] entered” in 2023. In 2024, the DHC entered an Order of Discipline ordering that “Defendant, Martin Musinguzi, is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.” On appeal, Defendant contended the State Bar does not have disciplinary jurisdiction over him because he is not a member of the State Bar and has not been “otherwise admitted to practice in North Carolina.”

Section 84-23 grants the Council “the authority to regulate the professional conduct of licensed lawyers and State Bar certified paralegals,” including the authority to “adopt rules of professional ethics and conduct” and to “investigate and prosecute matters of professional misconduct,” while Section 84-28 grants the Council “disciplinary jurisdiction” over “[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in this State” to enforce the rules the Council is empowered to adopt under Section 84-23. Thus, State Bar has “disciplinary jurisdiction” over “[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in this State” to enforce the rules adopted in accord with Section 84-23. Subsection 84-28(b) confirms that the disciplinary jurisdiction is limited to “[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in this State” by identifying the specific “acts or omissions by a member of the North Carolina State Bar or any attorney admitted for limited practice under G.S. 84-4.1[ 4]” that “shall constitute misconduct and shall be grounds for discipline[.]” Thus, the plain language of North Carolina General Statute Section 84-28(b) limits the “grounds for discipline” to “acts of omissions by a member of the North Carolina State Bar or any attorney admitted for limited practice under G.S. 84-4.1.”

The Order on Motion for Relief concluded the State Bar has subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant based on North Carolina General Statute Section 84- 23(a) and Rule 8.5(a) of the Rules of Professional conduct because Defendant is a “licensed lawyer” who has an office in Charlotte and represents clients who live in North Carolina, although his practice is limited to federal immigration court. But the plain language of the more specific statute, Section 84-28, read in conjunction with Section 84-23, grants the State Bar disciplinary jurisdiction only over “attorney[s] admitted to practice law in this State[.]”

The State Bar has “disciplinary jurisdiction” over “attorney[s] admitted to practice law in this State” no matter where they live or where their offices are located or where they do their work. It does not have disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys who are not admitted to practice in North Carolina and who practice only in federal court just because they may live in North Carolina or have an office in North Carolina. Rule 8.5 does not change our analysis because the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot grant or expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the State Bar beyond the boundaries set by North Carolina General Statute Section 84-28.

The DHC did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant since North Carolina General Statute Section 84-28 limits its disciplinary jurisdiction to “[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in this State” and Defendant is licensed in New York, not North Carolina, and limits his practice to federal immigration court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28. The more specific language in Section 84-28 controls over the more general grant of authority in Section 84-23. Further, Rule 8.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant beyond the plain language of North Carolina General Statute Section 84- 28. The DHC’s Order of Discipline and Order on Motion for Relief are both reversed.

Reversed.

The North Carolina State Bar v. Martin Musinguzi (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-151-25, 32 pp.) (Donna Stroud, J.) Appealed from the North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission. The North Carolina State Bar, by Deputy Counsel Robert W. Weston and Counsel Carmen H. Bannon, for plaintiff-appellee. Dowling PLLC, by Troy D. Shelton, for defendant-appellant. North Carolina Court of Appeals