Tort/Negligence – Public Official Immunity – Gross Negligence

The trial court did not err by denying the motion for summary judgment despite the defense of public official immunity.

The trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

In 2021, Defendant Rodriguez was in his patrol vehicle at a church parking lot on Old Lumberton Road while on duty for the Laurinburg Police Department (LPD). The interior of the vehicle included a switch that would activate both the siren and the lights when slid to a certain position. A few months before the incident, defendant’s vehicle went to the shop for repairs. After the repairs to the vehicle, the mechanic explained a separate siren knob must be turned on to activate both the siren and the lights when he moved the normal switch. Rodriguez testified he did not attempt to activate his siren and lights between the repair and the November incident, and he did not know how to activate the siren the day of the incident. Around 3:50 p.m. in November 2021, Rodriguez heard Corporal Teasley over the radio stating he was at the nearby Walmart to respond to a reported shoplifting incident. Although Corporal Teasley did not request assistance, Rodriguez decided to respond and assist Corporal Teasley in case the shoplifter was dangerous. Rodriguez pulled out onto Old Lumberton Road, a two-lane road in a residential area with a school bus route and many side roads, and drove westbound. There were three vehicles driving in front of Rodriguez and double lines on the road such that he could not pass the vehicles. Rodriguez decided to initiate an emergency response; he drove into the oncoming traffic lane and moved the switch to initiate both the lights and siren, while the lights turned on the siren did not, because the separate siren knob was turned off. Rodriguez looked down at the controls as he continued in the oncoming traffic lane, driving about 52- mph in the 35-mph speed limit zone. When Rodriguez looked up, he saw that the vehicle two cars in front of him was turning onto a side street. Although he stated he hit his brakes, the crash was instantaneous. Plaintiff was driving the vehicle and sustained serious life-altering injuries. The LPD assigned an officer to investigate the collision; at the conclusion of the investigation, the officer submitted a report that stated defendant Rodriguez violated multiple standard procedures. The report included a recommendation to issue a reprimand and suspend defendant Rodriguez from police duty. Rodriguez resigned from the LPD prior to the issuance and suspension.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Rodriguez in his individual and official capacities, and against the City of Laurinburg. Plaintiff brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and wanton negligence; imputed liability of the City for negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and willful and wanton conduct by its police officer; negligent supervision and inadequate training by the City; a claim for section 20-145 against Rodriguez; and sought punitive damages against both defendants in addition to the compensatory damages.

Defendants Rodriguez and the City of Laurinburg moved for summary judgment after discovery, asserting Rodriguez was entitled to public official immunity and that both the City and Rodriguez were “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court found genuine issues of material fact on plaintiff’s claims against defendants and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants sought interlocutory appeal by arguing public official immunity affects a substantial right.

Among other things, Defendants argued the court erred by denying summary judgment because Rodriguez’s conduct “did not rise to the level of gross negligence.” Every case involving section 20-145 and the gross negligence of a police officer considers and applies three components to determine whether their actions “constituted gross negligence.” These components are: “(1) the reason for the pursuit; (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Under the third component, we considered the following: “(1) whether an officer made use of the lights or siren, (2) whether the pursuit resulted in a collision, (3) whether an officer maintained control of the cruiser, (4) whether an officer followed department policies for pursuits, and (5) the speed of the pursuit.” A jury could find that Rodriguez’s actions “tended to show a high probability of injury to the public despite the absence of significant countervailing law enforcement benefits and thus raises a genuine issue of material fact on the question of gross negligence.” Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the gross negligence claim under section 20-145.

Affirmed.

Hatcher v. Rodriguez (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-156-25, 16 pp.) (Fred Gore, J.) Appealed from Scotland County Superior Court (Dawn M. Layton, J.) Law Offices of James Scott Farrin, by Coleman M. Cowan, Donald C. Clack, and Hannah L. Lavender, for plaintiff-appellee. Hall Booth Smith, P.C., by Christian J. Ferlan and Scott D. MacLatchie, for defendants-appellants. North Carolina Court of Appeals