Tort/Negligence – Contributorily Negligent – Last Clear Chance

The district court did not err in leaving it to the jury to weigh the probative value of the content of regulations against evidence of Defendant’s actions in assessing whether it was negligent.

We affirmed the jury’s verdict.

After a jury trial, Defendant farm was found liable for negligence resulting in injuries to longtime farm worker Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on the farm, and the resulting injuries required the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both parties committed negligence in the run up to the incident. However, it found the farm liable because it, and not Plaintiff, had the last clear chance to avoid Plaintiff’s injury. It therefore awarded damages to Plaintiff, including to his wife for loss of consortium. The farm appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence claims against it. It also challenged the court’s denial of its motion to bifurcate the trial into a liability phase and a damages phase, and the court’s denial of its motion to exclude testimony from Plaintiff’s farm safety expert.

The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant liable to Plaintiff for negligence. The jury found that (1) Plaintiff was injured by Defendant’s negligence; (2) Plaintiff was contributorily negligent; and (3) Defendant had the last clear chance to avoid Plaintiff’s injury. The jury awarded Plaintiff $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to Plaintiff’s wife. The jury did not find that Defendant had committed gross negligence or award punitive damages to Plaintiff.

Defendant contended on appeal, among other things, that the court erred by admitting “irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony” from Plaintiff’s expert witness. To that end, it contended the district court failed to abide by its Daubert gatekeeping obligation because it permitted improper testimony about OSHA regulations and the standard of care and because it permitted improper testimony about the safety of steel sump doors. The admission of expert evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sardis, 10 F.4th at 280. We concluded the district court acted within its discretion when it ruled as it did. The expert witness, as a farm safety expert, offered testimony that placed Defendant’s actions in the context of safety regulations established by a government agency, and the district court properly drew a line instructing the jury not to take the context of those regulations as per se evidence of negligence. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

Plyler v. Cox (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 001-143-25, 25 pp.) (Henry F. Floyd, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte (Frank D. Whitney, J.) ARGUED: Christopher P. Raab, CAUDLE & SPEARS, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. John Alexander Heroy, JAMES, MCELROY & DIEHL, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON BRIEF: L. Cameron Caudle, Jr., CAUDLE & SPEARS, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Preston O. Odom, III, Jennifer M. Houti, JAMES, MCELROY & DIEHL, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit