Criminal Practice – Rogers Error – Written Judgment

Despite the addition of “papers” to the written judgment, there was no reversible Rogers error.

We affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced Defendant to 212 months in prison and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court’s oral pronouncement of a discretionary condition of supervised release conflicts with the written judgment’s description of that condition, in violation of United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2020). Defendant thus contended he is entitled to a vacatur of his sentence and resentencing.

We rejected Defendant’s argument under Rogers, where we held that a district court is required to orally pronounce at sentencing all discretionary conditions of supervised release. When a district court includes in the written judgment a supervised release condition that was not orally pronounced, we generally vacate the defendant’s entire sentence and remand for resentencing. Relevant here, a reversible Rogers error may also exist if there is “a material discrepancy between a discretionary condition as pronounced and as detailed in a written judgment.” But we have explained that “the written judgment does not have to match perfectly with the oral pronouncement,” as “not all inconsistencies between the written judgment and what was orally pronounced are reversible error.”

The district court pronounced at the sentencing hearing that Defendant would be subject to the following discretionary supervised release condition related to warrantless searches: “[Y]ou will submit to a search at any time with or without a warrant and by any law enforcement officer or probation officer of your person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, the effects thereof, upon a reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of the condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct or by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s duties.” But in the written judgment, the district court added “papers” to the list of things that may be searched: “The defendant shall submit to a search, at any time, with or without a warrant, and by any law enforcement or probation officer, of the defendant’s person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, and effects upon reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant, or by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s supervision functions.”

Defendant maintained that the addition of “papers” to the written judgment contravenes Rogers and requires a vacatur of his sentence. We disagreed. Despite the addition of “papers” to the written judgment, we conclude that there is no reversible Rogers error here. The addition of “papers” does not impose any new obligation on Defendant because the orally pronounced condition authorizes warrantless searches of “any property” belonging to Defendant, which includes Defendant’s “papers.” To the extent there was ambiguity on whether Defendant’s “papers” could be searched under the “any property” provision, the written judgment clarified that matter. We thus concluded Defendant was not entitled to relief under Rogers.

Affirmed.

United States v. Joseph Griffin (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 001-198-25, 5 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh (Louise W. Flanagan, J.) ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished