Domestic Relations – Termination of Parental Rights Petition – Appellate Review in Juvenile Cases

The appeal was procedurally improper because termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions had been filed within the statutory period, thereby foreclosing immediate appellate review.

We dismissed a mother’s appeal from permanency planning orders eliminating reunification as a permanent plan.

This action arose following earlier proceedings in which the children were adjudicated neglected due to domestic violence in the home and instability in the mother’s caregiving. After extensive hearings, the trial court entered permanency planning orders that eliminated reunification with the mother for all three children, prompting an initial appeal that resulted in a remand for additional findings.

On remand, the trial court entered amended permanency planning orders again eliminating reunification. Shortly before and after these orders were entered, however, the county Department of Health and Human Services filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother attempted to appeal the remand orders directly under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(5), which permits immediate appeal of orders eliminating reunification, provided certain conditions are met, including that no TPR petition is filed within 65 days of the order.

We concluded that this statutory requirement was not satisfied. Because TPR petitions were filed within the 65-day window following entry of the remand orders, the statute barred the mother from pursuing an immediate direct appeal. Instead, the statutory framework required that she wait until the TPR proceedings were adjudicated and, if termination were granted, pursue a consolidated appeal of both the permanency planning orders and the TPR orders under § 7B-1001(a)(8). The filing of TPR petitions effectively shifts the appellate mechanism from immediate review to deferred, consolidated review.

The mother argued that the remand orders should be treated as part of her earlier appeal and not as new appealable orders subject to the statutory requirements. We rejected this argument, explaining that orders entered on remand are new orders that must independently satisfy the requirements for appellate jurisdiction. We also declined to recognize the concept of a “supplemental appeal,” noting that no statutory or precedential basis exists for such a procedure in North Carolina juvenile law.

Finally, the mother conditionally petitioned for a writ of certiorari, asserting that extraordinary circumstances warranted discretionary review. We denied the petition, finding no such circumstances. The mother had not lost her right to appellate review but merely faced a delay until the TPR proceedings were resolved. Because she could still obtain review through the proper statutory mechanism, extraordinary intervention was not justified. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition for certiorari, reinforcing the strict procedural requirements governing appellate review in juvenile cases.

Dismissed.

In the Matter of Q.J.P. (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-061-26, 10 pp.) (Donna Stroud, J.) Appealed from Buncombe County District Court (Susan M. Dotson-Smith, J.) Jack Densmore for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Health and Human Services. Jackson M. Pitts for guardian ad litem. Robinson & Lawing, LLP, by Christopher M. Watford, for respondent-appellant mother. North Carolina Court of Appeals