Criminal Practice – Premeditation – Rules of Evidence 403, 404(b)

There was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation; the trial court did not err by admitting testimony of Defendant’s prior violent behavior.

We found no error.

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered upon a jury’s guilty verdict of first-degree murder. Among other things, Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder because the State failed to present sufficient evidence Defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation when he shot and killed victim Marcus. We found the evidence indicates Defendant had thought through his actions before retrieving the gun and intentionally using deadly force. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.

Defendant next argued the trial court erred by admitting testimony of his prior violent behavior because the admission of the evidence violated Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404(b). Specifically, Defendant objected to the testimony of his girlfriend (Akira) regarding three prior incidents where Defendant was violent toward her. All three incidents involved Defendant’s violence toward Akira, Marcus’ sister, when Defendant and Akira were living in the same home with Marcus. This evidence provides context as to “circumstances surrounding the parties” and the relationship between Defendant, Akira, and her brother leading up to the shooting. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence under Rules 401 and 402.

Defendant also contended that this challenged evidence constitutes inadmissible character evidence and should have been excluded under Rule 404(b). The trial court found this evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b) to show “motive, opportunity to use the weapon in the subject of this action[, i]ntent, which is a necessary element of the crime charged in this case, and preparation to use the weapon that was used in this incident.” We agreed. The evidence in question shows that in the weeks and months leading up to the shooting, Defendant had been violent toward Akira. During at least one of the instances, Akira called out to her brother Marcus for help. This evidence, therefore, shows that Marcus, who lived under the same roof as Defendant and Akira, had become aware of the nature of Defendant and Akira’s relationship and the problems involved. Not only does this evidence help establish “the chain of circumstances or context of the charged crime,” but it indicates Defendant’s motive and intent to kill Marcus. The evidence in question is also sufficiently similar and temporally proximate to the charged crime. All of the events testified to by Akira involved violent acts committed by Defendant, who committed the charged crime of first-degree murder. This evidence also demonstrates Defendant’s prior use of his gun—the same gun he used to shoot and kill Marcus. Furthermore, these prior acts occurred not long before the shooting. Even so, any remoteness in time to the charged crime is less significant because the evidence of these prior acts was used in part to show Defendant’s motive and intent to kill Marcus. Accordingly, all three requirements for evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b) were met, and the trial court did not err by admitting the evidence of Defendant’s prior violent acts toward Akira under Rule 404(b).

Defendant further argued that the challenged evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403. The evidence of Defendant’s prior violent acts toward Akira provides context surrounding the nature of Defendant’s relationship with Akira and Marcus in the weeks leading up to the shooting. The evidence was also used by the State to show Defendant’s motive, intent, and opportunity to use his gun to kill Marcus. As such, Defendant’s prior violent acts toward Akira were probative. Furthermore, the admission of this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to Defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of Defendant’s prior violent acts toward Akira under Rule 403.

Finally, Defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to allow evidence of Marcus’ alleged gang involvement to be admitted. The trial court determined that evidence of Marcus’ alleged gang membership was irrelevant, and even if it was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Even if relevant, we agreed with the trial court that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence that Defendant feared for his life because Marcus belonged to a gang does little to support his theory of self-defense, and such evidence would have had “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Defendant’s evidence of Marcus’ alleged gang involvement.

No error.

State of North Carolina v. Shajuan Dwatray Ervin (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-073-25, 20 pp.) (Allegra Collins, J.) Appealed from Durham County Superior Court (James E. Hardin Jr., J.) Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert C. Montgomery, for the State-Appellee; William D. Spence for Defendant-Appellant. North Carolina Court of Appeals