Real Property – Restrictive Covenants – Equestrian Community – Pet Goats

Steiner v. Windrow Estates Home Owners Association, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-07-0723, 25 pp.) (Donna S. Stroud, J.) Appealed from Mecklenburg County District Court. (Timothy M. Smith, J.) N.C. App. Click here for the full-text opinion.

Holding: The restrictive covenants for the parties’ neighborhood prohibit livestock (other than horses) and permit household pets; however, the covenants do not define “livestock” or “pets.” Using the ordinary meanings of these words, since plaintiffs’ Nigerian Dwarf goats are kept for pleasure rather than for profit or utility, they are pets and not livestock within the meaning of the restrictive covenants.

We affirm summary judgment for plaintiffs.

Windrow Estates’ restrictive covenant 9 states, “No animals, livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred or kept on any lot except that horses, dogs, cats or other pets may be kept provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes, unless allowed by Windrow Estates Property Owners’ Association, and provided that such household pets do not attack horses or horsemen.”

Defendant’s arguments on appeal primarily focus on the meaning and interpretation of the words “livestock,” “pets,” and “household pets,” and the purpose and intent of the restrictive covenants. As the restrictive covenants do not define any of these words, we must use the words’ ordinary meaning.

“Livestock” is defined as “animals kept or raised for use or pleasure;  esp: farm animals kept for use and profit….” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 728 (11th ed. 2003). The same dictionary defines a “pet,” inter alia, as “a domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility….”

Thus, the distinguishing feature between “livestock” and a “pet” is that “livestock” is primarily “kept for use and profit” while a “pet” is “kept for pleasure….”

Defendant contends, “The [restrictive covenants] at issue ha[ve] a specific restriction on livestock, which includes goats.”

Defendant then directs our attention to legal definitions of “livestock,” including the Matthews Town Ordinance. However, legal definitions of “livestock” are not controlling in our analysis; here, the restrictive covenants did not define “livestock,” nor did the restrictive covenants refer to or incorporate any legal definitions such as the Matthews Town Ordinance; thus, we are bound by the ordinary meaning of the word.

Nothing can be read into a restrictive covenant enlarging its meaning beyond what its language plainly and unmistakably imports; therefore, we consider the ordinary meaning of the word “livestock.”

As it is undisputed that plaintiffs’ goats, Fred and Barney, were kept for pleasure rather than for profit or utility, they are pets and not livestock under paragraph 9 of the restrictive covenants.

Defendant next contends that, because “the goats are not kept in the house, but instead outside with [the] horses … [they] are not household pets.”

We do not find the fact that the goats do not literally live inside the house to be dispositive of the issue. First, the ordinary meaning of the adjective “household” requires that something be “of or relating to” the household, not actually inside of the house.

The restrictive covenants are so broad as to allow for virtually any animal which may be treated as a “household pet” to be  kept on the homeowner’s property, so long as the animal is “not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purposes” and  does  “not  attack horses or horsemen.”

If the intent and purpose of the restrictive covenants were to prevent goats or other similar animals from being kept on the property, they certainly could have forbidden specific types of animals or provided specific definitions for material terms such as “household pets.” Instead, the restrictive covenants must be construed pursuant to the ordinary meaning of the words used; under this construction, Fred and Barney are plaintiffs’ household pets.

Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the restrictive covenants, Fred and Barney are not livestock. They are household pets, and their presence on plaintiffs’ property does not inhibit or contradict the stated intent and purpose of the restrictive covenants to establish an “equestrian community.” Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for plaintiffs as to this issue.

Paragraph 6 of the restrictive covenants provides, “No offensive or noxious activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon tending to cause embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, or nuisance to the neighborhood. There shall not be maintained any plants or animals, or device or thing of any sort whose normal activity or existence is in any way noxious, dangerous, unsightly, unpleasant or of a nature as may diminish or destroy the enjoyment of other property in the neighborhood by the owners thereof; except that horses and stables may be maintained, but every effort must be made to reduce stable odors.”

Paragraph 6 is void for vagueness. Its operative words are embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, nuisance, noxious, unsightly, and unpleasant. Each of these words describes a subjective and personal experience or feeling.

Under paragraph 6 of the restrictive covenants, the emotional reaction of annoyance of a property owner could be the basis for making an activity a violation of the covenants.

Certain property owners in Windrow Estates consider Fred and Barney to be annoying, noxious, and unpleasant; plaintiffs consider them adorable and lovable. The restrictive covenants as written do not provide sufficient guidance or definitions to permit defendant’s board, or a court, to make any sort of objective determination of who is right, and this is the essence of vagueness.

Even though the trial court did not make “vagueness” a basis for its ruling, plaintiffs did raise this issue as a ground for summary judgment before the trial court. We may affirm the trial court’s ruling for any reason presented before it which is supported by the evidence and the law.

We affirm summary judgment for plaintiffs.