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Workers’ Compensation – Settlement Agreement – Asbestosis – Death Benefits – Statutory Time Limitations

Workers’ Compensation – Settlement Agreement – Asbestosis – Death Benefits – Statutory Time Limitations

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Coffey v. Weyerhaeuser (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-07-0048, 14 pp.) (Douglas McCullough, J.) Appealed from the Industrial Commission. N.C. App. Click here for the full-text opinion.

Holding: Where a worker reached a with his employer regarding compensation and weekly lifetime benefits for full and permanent disability due to occupational disease, the worker’s heirs are still held to the statutory standard – and barred from seeking when worker died more than two years after the agreement was signed, or six years after his original date of disability.

Background

Dennis H. Barber, Sr., worked at the Weyerhaeuser plant in Plymouth from 1953 to 1974. On May 30, 1997, he was diagnosed with , and on April 28, 1998, he was diagnosed with asbestos-related laryngeal cancer.

Barber filed a workers compensation claim and on Oct. 27, 1999, he and his employer reached an Agreement of Settlement, providing Barber with a final award of compensation for his asbestosis and cancer, as well as weekly payments for life for his full and permanent disability. In pertinent part here, the agreement also made clear that Barber reserved the right in the future to bring a workers compensation action for “death benefits, pursuant to G.S. § 97-38…. For purposes of a potential claim for benefits under [that statute] the parties agree that the date of approval of this Agreement shall be the date of final determination of disability by the Industrial Commission.” The settlement was officially approved on Nov. 1, 1999.

Barber died as a result of his asbestos-related illnesses just over nine years later, on Jan. 4, 2009. His four children, the plaintiffs in this case, filed a Form 18B seeking death benefits from their father’s employer, on April 13, 2009. A few weeks later, the defendant filed a Form 61, rejecting the death benefit request because it was barred by the time limitations imposed in the statute, §97-38.

A deputy commissioner heard the case and ruled in favor of plaintiffs, whose claim he said was timely filed. Defendant then sought a hearing before the full commission, which reversed its deputy and denied plaintiffs’ claim as untimely under G.S. § 97-38. Plaintiffs appealed.

Discussion

Under § 97-38 of the Workers’ Compensation Act,  if death results proximately from a compensable injury or occupational disease and within six years thereafter, or within two years of the final determination of disability, whichever is later, the employer shall pay death benefits to certain beneficiaries defined under that section. Therefore, family members of a deceased worker have a solid claim under the statute so long as the statute of limitations has not run.

In this case, both the plaintiffs and defendant agreed that Mr. Barber died more than six years after his disability. Therefore, the court limits its review to whether the death occurred within two years of the commission’s determination of final disability.

Plaintiffs argued first that they couldn’t be held to the 1999 settlement agreement because they weren’t parties to that agreement. However, the benefits at issue are not a matter of contract, but one of statute.

The settlement constituted a final determination of disability in Barber’s case, and the commission’s decision is as binding as any adversarial court’s. The 1999 agreement left nothing further to be decided regarding Barber’s disability, and the record shows that following the commission’s approval of the agreement on Nov. 1, 1999, until Barber’s death nine years later, no other issues regarding Barber’s disability were brought before the commission.

By adhering to the statutory time limitations, we follow our Supreme Court’s admonition that death benefits are reserved for when an employee meets an unexpected and untimely demise. The benefit is not intended as the equivalent of general accident, health or life insurance.

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ argument that § 97-38 is unconstitutional is without precedent or merit.

Affirmed.


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