Tort/Negligence – STCA – Damages – Companion Dog – Veterinary Expenses & Replacement Cost

Shera v. N.C. State University Veterinary Teaching Hospital (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-07-0213, 20 pp.) (Douglas McCullough, J.) Appealed from the Industrial Commission. N.C. App. Full-text opinion.

Holding: Plaintiffs brought their Jack Russell terrier to defendant for treatment, and defendant’s negligence led to the dog’s death. Following the law of this state, the Industrial Commission correctly limited plaintiffs’ damages to the cost of the ill-fated veterinary treatment and the cost to buy another Jack Russell.

We affirm the Industrial Commission’s award.

Companion animals are considered species of property. A civil action for the negligent injury to or loss of a dog is maintainable.

In such case, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the damaged property immediately before and immediately after the injury. In cases where the personal property at issue is not commonly traded and has no ascertainable market value, a jury may infer the market value of the property from evidence of the replacement cost.

The Commission concluded, “The courts have not recognized intrinsic value as the proper measure for damages for the loss of an animal” and declined “to expand the intrinsic value category of damages by applying it to the instant case.”

Plaintiffs argue that in a case such as this, where the injured or destroyed “property” is a companion animal, such as their beloved pet dog, the market value measure of damages is “inapt.” Plaintiffs argue that because companion animals are “sentient beings,” a “unique” and special kind of personal property, the measure of damages in a negligence case involving the loss of a companion animal should be the “actual” or “intrinsic” value of the animal.

Plaintiffs contend this type of damages has been recognized under our law and that companion animals, in particular plaintiffs’ dog Laci, qualify for this type of valuation. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend the Commission erred in not applying the actual or intrinsic value measure in the present case.

Plaintiffs stress Laci served a “therapeutic” purpose to her owners and was vital to plaintiff Herbert Shera’s heart condition therapy, which is simply not replaceable by purchasing another Jack Russell.

However, the evidence produced at the hearing does not establish any particular “therapeutic” purpose served by Laci, and the Commission made no such finding. Rather, plaintiffs’ testimony at the hearing continuously reflects the understandable emotional and sentimental connection plaintiffs had formed with their pet.

The testimony reveals no absolute unique tasks or functions that Laci performed for plaintiffs, aside from her calming presence, that could not be performed by another pet dog. Rather, the substance of the testimony supports only the fact that plaintiffs’ emotional bond with their pet is irreplaceable -something that is not recognized as compensable under our law.

Our case law has been consistent in denying recovery for sentimental value of negligently lost or destroyed personal property.

Plaintiffs point to the $28,000 they invested in Laci’s care throughout her lifetime as objective evidence of Laci’s actual value to them as owners. However, plaintiffs fail to adequately explain how amounts spent on the dog’s care prior to March 31, 2007, when Laci was admitted to defendant’s care and negligently killed, were proximately related in any way to defendant’s negligent act on April 6, 2007 and plaintiffs’ resulting injury.

In fact, the evidence shows Laci was successfully treated for cancer in 2003-2004 by both the Veterinary Specialty Hospital and defendant, and plaintiffs testified at the hearing that the amounts they expended on Laci’s oncology treatment was worth it for “every extra minute” they were able to spend with their pet thereafter. We fail to see how such expenditures prior to defendant’s negligent acts can be considered in any way in a damages award, regardless of the valuation method employed.

N.C. law has not yet recognized a lost investment valuation method in wrongful death cases, whether human child or pet animal.

Although the actual value measure of damages exists under our law, such damages awards have proven to be the rare exception and have never been applied either to enhance a damages award or to the recovery of damages for the loss of companion animals. This is surely due in part to the fact that a multitude of companion animals are available in our society, and although the replacement of the unique human-animal bond between an owner and his or her pet is impossible, replacement of the type of property – a companion animal  – currently is possible under our law.

The sentimental bond between a human and his or her pet companion can neither be quantified in monetary terms nor compensated for under our current law.

We sincerely empathize with plaintiffs’ loss of their beloved pet Laci.  Unfortunately for plaintiffs, however, this court is not in the position to expand the law. Rather, such considerations must be presented to our Supreme Court or our legislature, who have the power to rectify any inequities in both the labeling of companion animals as mere property and the current market valuation of companion animals in negligence cases.

Affirmed.