Labor & Employment — Court Employee Can Try ADA Claim

Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts (Lawyers Weekly No. 15-01-0248, 46 pp.) (Floyd, J.) No. 13-2212, March 12, 2015; USDC at Wilmington, N.C. (Boyle, J.) 4^th Cir.

Holding: A deputy clerk in a North Carolina state courthouse who asked to be excused from public-desk duty because of her social anxiety disorder can try her suit alleging she was discriminated against and terminated because of her disability after she sought an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act; the 4^th Circuit reverses summary judgment for defendant elected clerk of court and other court officials.

The district court erred by failing to consider all the evidence in the record. The district court opinion also states the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant, not the nonmovant plaintiff. Strikingly, both of the district court’s key factual findings – that plaintiff was not disabled and that the clerk did not learn of plaintiff’s accommodation request prior to terminating her – rest on factual inferences contrary to plaintiff’s competent evidence. The district court thus improperly resolved factual issues at the summary judgment stage, in contravention of well-settled law.

During the course of discovery, both parties produced expert testimony by mental health specialists on the issue social anxiety disorder. The district court determined from a report by a defense expert, who did not examine plaintiff, and plaintiff’s behavior at work that she was not disabled. Inexplicably, the district court omits any mention of a conflicting report from a forensic psychologist who examined plaintiff. Also, the defense expert’s report simply does not support the finding of no disability – rather, he concluded only that plaintiff’s medical records were equivocal on the question. We reverse the district court’s determination that there is no genuine dispute as to whether plaintiff had a disability.

The district court determined there was no evidence that the clerk knew plaintiff had requested an accommodation at the time she made the decision to terminate plaintiff. This finding has no basis in the record. Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record demonstrates just the opposite.

It is undisputed that plaintiff emailed her request for an accommodation to the clerk on Sept. 9, 2009. Plaintiff also emailed her request to her immediate supervisors and discussed her request in person with her immediate supervisor, Jan Kennedy. Kennedy told plaintiff she could not act on plaintiff’s request without discussing it first with the clerk. Upon returning to the office on Sept. 29, the clerk held a meeting with plaintiff’s three immediate supervisors. Kennedy testified that the supervisors discussed plaintiff during this meeting. The clerk then called plaintiff into the meeting and summarily fired her in front of the three supervisors. A reasonable jury could infer that before plaintiff walked in, any or all of plaintiff’s supervisors would have discussed the accommodation request email.

Termination Meeting

Properly viewed, the record also demonstrates the clerk read the email before firing plaintiff. Plaintiff testified she saw the annotated email on the clerk’s desk as she entered the office for the meeting with supervisors and the clerk. The clerk admitted to having annotated the email but testified she only did so after the meeting. During the meeting, the clerk told plaintiff that when she was hired she expressed she would be able to handle “front counter work,” that it “wouldn’t be problematic.” If the clerk had called the meeting without knowledge of the accommodation request, it is unlikely she would have addressed the possibility of reassigning plaintiff when she said she had no place she could use plaintiff’s services.

A reasonable jury could infer from the testimony and the recording of the conversation that the clerk knew about plaintiff’s accommodation request at the time she decided to terminate plaintiff. We reverse the district court’s determination to the contrary.

We find a reasonable jury could conclude plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to interact with others and thus was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, despite her ability to interact with colleagues. Also, to the extent plaintiff’s Facebook activity constitutes a “mitigating measure,” we are not permitted to consider it in determining the existence of a substantial limitation on her ability to interact with others.

Also, given that plaintiff was promoted to deputy clerk after one month on the job and the total lack of documentary evidence of plaintiff’s alleged poor job performance, a reasonable jury could conclude plaintiff was qualified for the job. Finally, a reasonable jury could conclude the clerk knew of plaintiff’s alleged disability and it prompted her termination three weeks after she made the request for accommodation.

We reverse in part the district court’s order granting summary judgment against plaintiff and remand to the district court for trial of her ADA disability discrimination, retaliation and failure to accommodate claims.