Criminal Practice – Motion to Suppress – Traffic Stop

The district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

We affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute fentanyl and aiding and abetting the same. The charges arose after a DEA Task Force Officer Thomas initiated a traffic stop in Missouri of a vehicle in which Defendant was the passenger. During the traffic stop, Officer Thomas obtained the driver’s consent to search the vehicle and conduct a K-9 sniff. The search resulted in the discovery of seven brick-type packages and two sealed plastic bags containing thousands of small blue pills containing what forensic experts would later identify as fentanyl. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the search, arguing that the search was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Defendant of the charges.

On appeal, Defendant contended the court erred in denying the motion to suppress because (1) the driver’s consent was involuntary and invalid because it was given when the driver was seized; (2) the stop had been impermissibly prolonged; and (3) Officer Thomas did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to conduct a dog sniff.

Approximately five minutes into the stop, Officer Thomas asked the driver for his consent to search the vehicle. The driver replied, “Go ahead, I see you have a dog, you should use the dog too.” Right after that exchange, Thomas asked Defendant for his consent, and he also agreed. These exchanges took place during Thomas’ questioning and during routine conversation. Defendant and the driver both understood English. Additionally, Thomas was the only officer present when he asked for their consent, and neither the driver nor Defendant were physically inside the officer’s vehicle. Under the totality of circumstances, these facts show that the consent was voluntary, and therefore valid.

Officer Thomas’ subsequent search of vehicle and K-9 sniff did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights. Further, Officer Thomas did not impermissibly prolong the stop prior to asking for consent. Thomas had not unlawfully prolonged the stop when the driver and Defendant gave Thomas consent to search the vehicle because he asked for consent while he processed the traffic citation. Thomas asked basic questions when he was obtaining documents from the driver at the vehicle. Thomas then asked the driver to exit the vehicle while he conducted a records check. Thomas continued talking with the driver during the records check and asked for his consent to search the vehicle while working on his in-car computer, which was necessary to the mission of the traffic stop. Thomas estimated that his request for consent occurred approximately five minutes after he initially stopped the vehicle. There is no indication that the request for consent occurred after Thomas completed tasks tied to the traffic violation or evidence that Thomas should have reasonably completed his tasks within five to seven minutes.

Given these conclusions, we did not need to determine whether Thomas had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.

Affirmed.

U.S. v. Valenzuela (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-057-26, 5 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh (Richard E. Myers, II, C.J.) ON BRIEF: Raymond C. Tarlton, TARLTON LAW PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Katherine S. Englander, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished