Labor & Employment – Civil Rights – ADA – Reasonable Accommodations – Accommodation Process

Rittelmeyer v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-086-17, 41 pp.) (Donna Stroud, J.) Appealed from Wake County Superior Court (Paul Gessner, J.) N.C. App.

Holding: The respondent-employer did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act when it worked with petitioner to shield her from the fluorescent lights that gave her migraines but then fired petitioner when she stopped coming to work or communicating with respondent after an extended leave period expired.

Although respondent tried the accommodation of turning off all fluorescent lights, and although this accommodation was effective for petitioner, respondent was not required to continue this accommodation when other employees complained.

We affirm the superior court’s order upholding respondent’s termination of petitioner’s employment.

The parties do not dispute that petitioner’s light sensitivity, which leads to migraine headaches, is a “disability” as defined by the ADA, and for purposes of this opinion we assume petitioner is qualified for the job. Thus, all that remains to consider is plaintiff’s contention that she was unlawfully discriminated against by respondent because of her disability.

In this case, the alleged discrimination is petitioner’s termination. Therefore, the crucial issue is whether “Respondent met its obligations to provide Petitioner with reasonable accommodations under the ADA” because, if respondent met this obligation, then petitioner’s failure to return to work would be without legal justification and that would be a proper ground for termination, not a discriminatory one.

Petitioner argues that the only accommodations that qualify as “reasonable” are those that would have been effective in eliminating her migraines at work. However, this argument is foreclosed by US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).

Under Barnett, an “ineffective modification” is one which “will not accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations.” The most obvious modification to accommodate light sensitivity is to eliminate an employee’s exposure to lights, if possible, and otherwise to reduce exposure to light as much as possible without excessive interference with the ability of other employees to do their work.

Respondent tried many of the measures listed in 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9). For example, respondent offered “job restructuring” by proposing that petitioner, a social clinical research assistant in respondent’s Department of Medicine and Genetics, work from home; petitioner rejected this proposal more than once. Respondent also “modif[ied] … equipment or devices” by making many changes to petitioner’s cubicle and to lights throughout the work area. The modifications were objectively reasonable in that they lessened petitioner’s exposure to light, while allowing other employees adequate light to work.

Over the course of several months respondent made many accommodations, while respondent also had to address complaints of other employees who were having difficulty seeing in darkened areas of the workplace.

Respondent was also trying to hit a moving target, since petitioner’s light sensitivity increased over time. Petitioner rejected the option of wearing room-darkening glasses, although she admitted that she used them elsewhere. It is clear that respondent made numerous reasonable accommodations.

The fact that the supervisor was willing to try certain accommodations does not mean she was then bound to continue an accommodation even if it ended up being untenable. The supervisor tried turning off all overhead florescent lights, but she later determined that this accommodation could not continue due to other employees’ complaints.

An employer should not be punished for being willing to try an accommodation which ends up not working, whether due to the disabled employee, other employees, or the employer. It is not objectively reasonable to require all other employees to work without overhead lights in this particular situation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) mandates that the employer must demonstrate undue hardship if refusing a reasonable accommodation, not an unreasonable accommodation proposed by the disabled employee.

Respondent engaged in the interactive process in good faith. Petitioner was not terminated for her disability; instead, she was terminated because she stopped coming to work without even letting respondent know that she would not report to work as scheduled, after she also repeatedly refused to work from home.

Affirmed.