Labor & Employment – At-Will Employment – Wrongful Discharge

We affirmed dismissal as to plaintiff’s pregnancy and disability-based claims, but the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim based on sex discrimination.

That portion of the lower court’s Order must be reversed and the matter remanded.

Plaintiff, an attorney, began employment with defendant in November 2022 following an extensive recruitment process for a senior legal role. During recruitment, defendant represented that plaintiff would be groomed for a Deputy General Counsel position and repeatedly conveyed that advancement would be swift. Despite expressing concern about being the only woman on the legal team, plaintiff accepted the role. She worked approximately three months, received positive feedback, and met or exceeded expectations in her sole performance evaluation.

In December 2022, plaintiff learned she was pregnant. Concerned that disclosure might negatively affect her professional advancement, she did not inform defendant at that time. In 2023, plaintiff suffered a miscarriage. For approximately two weeks, she experienced medical emergencies requiring professional attention and communicated regularly with defendant regarding her inability to be present or her need to work remotely. At the request of her supervising General Counsel, plaintiff disclosed the miscarriage and requested short-term remote work. Human Resources requested documentation to verify her medical visits. Plaintiff alleged that similarly situated male colleagues were not required to provide such documentation and that the General Counsel had the authority to approve her accommodations personally.

Although plaintiff provided medical records, she alleged General Counsel remained skeptical and resentful of her need for remote work. After returning to the office, he allegedly told her she needed to “repair” her relationship with the CEO and, in February, stated he had never considered her for the Deputy General Counsel position, contradicting prior representations. In February, plaintiff received a performance review indicating she met expectations and exceeded expectations for professionalism. Nevertheless, in March, defendant terminated her employment, citing concerns about trustworthiness and teamwork. Plaintiff alleged these reasons were pretextual and that her termination was motivated by her sex, pregnancy-related circumstances, disability stemming from the miscarriage, and her complaints of disparate treatment.

Plaintiff initially filed suit alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. After dismissal without prejudice, she refiled asserting claims based on sex and pregnancy discrimination and disability discrimination. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, prompting this appeal.

On appeal, we concluded that dismissal was proper as to pregnancy and disability claims. North Carolina has not established a public policy protecting against pregnancy-specific employment discrimination, and plaintiff failed to allege a qualifying disability existing at the time of termination or that defendant was aware of any ongoing impairment.

However, dismissal of her wrongful discharge claim based on sex discrimination was premature. Plaintiff alleged facts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that her sex was a motivating factor, including heightened scrutiny after medical leave, disparate treatment compared to male colleagues, rescinded advancement promises, and termination shortly after a positive performance review. Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim under N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2, which should proceed to further factual development.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Edwards v. Strata Solar LLC (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-308-25, 14 pp.) (John Arrowood, J.) Appealed from Durham County Superior Court. (John M. Dunlow, J.) Elliot Morgan Parsonage, PLLC, by R. Michael Elliot and Suzanne Reynolds, for plaintiff-appellant. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Phillip J. Strach and Nathaniel J. Pencook, for defendant-appellee. North Carolina Court of Appeals