Criminal Practice – Court Need Not Decide Double Jeopardy Claim

Robinson v. Thomas, Warden (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-095-17, 23 pp.) (Agee, J.) No. 16-11, April 27, 2017; USDC at Raleigh, N.C. (Dever, J.) 4th Cir.

Holding: The 4th Circuit upholds a district court decision to abstain from intervening in two convicted murderers’ proceeding asserting that a North Carolina state court’s second review, on appeal by the state, of their right to review of their death sentences under the North Carolina Racial Justice Act would violate their rights under the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause.

Death Penalty Review

Enacted in 2009, the Racial Justice Act redefined eligibility for the death penalty in North Carolina. The RJA provided that no person whose judgment was sought or obtained on the basis of race could be sentenced to death, and it established a procedure for previously sentenced capital defendants to challenge their death sentences.

The state legislature repealed the RJA effective June 19, 2013. The repeal statute provided that it applied to all pending RJA motions filed prior to the effective date of the repeal, and that all such motions were void. In addition, the repeal statute also provided that it applied to litigants who obtained relief under the RJA, but whose relief could be vacated on appeal.

In 2010, the state court found that racial disparities impacted petitioner Robinson’s death sentence and determined that the RJA standards were satisfied so that Robinson was ineligible for the death penalty and entitled to a life sentence instead. Also in 2010, a state trial court concluded that statistical disparities and intentional discrimination affected petitioner Golphin’s trial and capital sentencing. The court vacated Golphin’s death sentence based upon both the original RJA and amended 2012 version and resentenced him to life imprisonment without parole.

In both petitioners’ cases, the state won state high court review, and petitioners proffered Double Jeopardy Clause arguments in their merits briefing. Without explicitly addressing the double jeopardy arguments, the state Supreme Court vacated the trial courts’ RIA orders and remanded for further proceedings. Petitioners then filed habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal court, seeking relief from a second RJA proceeding. The district court abstained from exercising federal jurisdiction pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Abstention Doctrine

The double jeopardy argument became ripe upon the state’s appeal of the trial court’s grant of petitioners’ RJA motions. The state’s argument that petitioners failed to exhaust their state remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court lacks merit.

The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court property abstained under Younger. Because the basic requirements for Younger abstention are present in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining unless petitioners’ claims fall within an exception to the “fundamental policy” that federal courts should abstain from interfering in state criminal proceedings.

Here, petitioners have failed to show some extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that they do not have an adequate remedy at law and the danger of irreparable injury if they are denied equitable relief is both great and immediate. The state need only allow petitioners the opportunity to raise their constitutional argument; it need not agree with that argument.

Petitioners may not seek federal intervention into their pending state court litigation for a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because they have failed to show that North Carolina’s pretrial procedures are not able to afford them adequate protection.

Judgment affirmed.