Civil Rights – Qualified Immunity – Excessive Force

The district court failed to conduct the qualified immunity analysis, particularly by failing to identify the clearly established right at issue.

We vacated and remanded.

The district court denied Police Officer Heather Loveridge qualified immunity as to a federal claim and public officers’ immunity as to state claims asserted against her by a fellow law enforcement officer whom she shot by mistake when the two — along with other officers — were engaged in attempting to seize a violent suspect pursuant to a warrant. The district court concluded that because the facts material to liability were disputed and therefore precluded summary judgment, the facts material to immunity were also disputed and therefore precluded granting Officer Loveridge immunity. But in doing so, the court failed to conduct the distinct analysis required for determining immunity, which includes identifying the clearly established constitutional right that Officer Loveridge violated either knowingly or because she was plainly incompetent.

Six law enforcement officers attempted to execute a search warrant at the house of Larry McConneyhead, who was suspected of trafficking in methamphetamine. The group enforcing the search warrant included four officers of the FBI’s Safe Streets Task Force, Task Force Officers (TFOs) Clarence Belton (plaintiff in this case), and three others. It also included two police officers, including Heather Loveridge (defendant in this case), to show a police presence with marked vehicles and provide backup support. Loveridge subsequently fired at TFO Belton, believing he was McConneyhead. In a single burst, she fired over 10 shots in Belton’s direction in the course of a few seconds. When someone yelled, “He’s a cop,” Loveridge immediately stopped firing. Belton suffered wounds to both arms that required several surgeries, and his injuries, which are permanent, prevent him from continuing to serve as a law enforcement officer.

The North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation investigated the incident, and the District Attorney for Mecklenburg County decided not to seek charges against Loveridge for her use of deadly force against TFO Belton, citing the difficulty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that her use of such force was unreasonable. The Internal Affairs Bureau of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department also conducted an investigation and determined that Loveridge had violated the Department’s directive regarding the use of deadly force.

Belton alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Loveridge in her individual capacity, asserting she used excessive force against him, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a negligence claim against the City of Charlotte and Loveridge in her official capacity; an assault and battery claim against Loveridge in her individual capacity; and a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against Loveridge in both her official and individual capacities.

Loveridge moved for summary judgment asserting her conduct was lawful and she was, in any event, entitled to qualified immunity as to the federal excessive force claim and public officers’ immunity as to the state tort claims. The district court denied her motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact.

In asserting qualified immunity on appeal, Loveridge contended that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment when she uses lethal force to counteract a deadly threat to herself or others — even if the officer mistakenly shoots the wrong person. She also contended that even if she violated TFO Belton’s Fourth Amendment rights, those rights were not clearly established such that every reasonable officer in her circumstances would have known that he or she was violating the Fourth Amendment. First, while the district court found a factual dispute whether Loveridge had an opportunity to see TFO Belton before the door was breached, we found no evidence in the record from which to conclude that Loveridge intended to shoot Belton instead of the suspect. But this does not determine whether Loveridge is protected by qualified immunity. And the district court did not apply the well-established analysis for determining Loveridge’s qualified immunity, vel non. Belton alleged Loveridge unreasonably seized him, as proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, when she shot and injured him. While the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures, it is not unreasonable for a police officer to “use deadly force when the officer has sound reason to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.”

While Loveridge seized Belton when she shot him, the key question was whether that seizure was unreasonable. Because the court failed to conduct the immunity analysis, particularly by failing to identify the clearly established right at issue, we vacated the order and remanded to enable the court to conduct the appropriate analysis. And, because officers are not entitled to public officers’ immunity under North Carolina law if they violate clearly established rights, we vacated and remanded the district court’s determination that Loveridge was not entitled to immunity on Belton’s state law claims.

Vacated and remanded with instructions.

Clarence Delano Belton Jr. v. Loveridge (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 001-062-25, 14 pp.) (Paul V. Niemeyer, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte (Max O. Cogburn, Jr., J.) Argued: Steven Andrew Bader, Cranfill Sumner LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant; Mark Lowell Hayes, Law Office of Mark L. Hayes, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee. On Brief: Stephanie H. Webster, Cranfill Sumner LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant; Kathleen C. Clary, Amanda A. Mingo, Rawls, Scheer, Clary & Mingo, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit