North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff//September 24, 2025//
North Carolina Lawyers Weekly Staff//September 24, 2025//
SUMMARY
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a school bus driver’s certificate may qualify as a statutory “license,” but it is not a “driver’s license” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration of remaining issues.
The 20-page opinion is Savage v. N.C. Department of Transportation.
The plaintiff worked for the defendant as a driver education program specialist, training and certifying school bus drivers. After the defendant discovered the plaintiff had recertified several drivers without required ride-along observations, it fired the plaintiff for unacceptable personal conduct and asserted that § 20-34.1 mandated dismissal. That criminal statute makes it a felony to knowingly enter false information “concerning a driver’s license or a special identification card” into certain department records and requires any offending employee to be dismissed.
An administrative law judge found the defendant lacked just cause to terminate the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that false information about a school bus driver’s certificate was information “concerning a driver’s license” because it was stored in the same database as driver’s license records.
The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. Emphasizing statutory text, the court explained that the General Assembly defined “license” broadly elsewhere in chapter 20 but chose the narrower phrase “driver’s license” in § 20-34.1. The court presumed that choice was intentional. Reading the statute in context, the court concluded the legislature targeted conduct leading to fake or illegal government identification — such as falsifying driver’s licenses or special identification cards — not errors or misstatements about supplemental credentials like school bus certificates. Because the plaintiff’s conduct did not involve false information “concerning a driver’s license,” § 20-34.1 did not apply, and the statute’s mandatory-dismissal clause could not supply automatic just-cause termination.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to that court to address unresolved issues raised on appeal.
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