Civil Rights – Excessive Force – Reach for Taser – Gunshot in Elbow

Henry v. Purnell. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-01-0950, 36 pp.)  (Agee, J.) No. 08-7433, Sept. 24, 2010; USDC at Baltimore (Motz, J.) 4th Cir.

Holding: A Maryland deputy who reached for his Taser, but grabbed his Glock instead when he tried to execute a warrant after defendant failed to appear on a child support-related charge, has qualified immunity from the man’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not under state law, for injuries from being shot in the elbow, the 4th Circuit says.

Robert Purnell, a deputy sheriff in Somerset County, Md., attempted to execute a warrant for Frederick Henry’s arrest. Henry fled on foot, and Deputy Purnell gave chase, mistakenly drawing his firearm, instead of his Taser, and shooting Henry in the elbow.

As a result of this incident, Henry filed a § 1983 suit against Deputy Purnell, asserting Purnell used excessive force in effecting his arrest. The district court ultimately concluded that Deputy Purnell’s mistake was reasonable and granted his motion for summary judgment.

We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions.

The district court erred in limiting the scope of its Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis to the adequacy of Deputy Purnell’s weapons training, instead of examining the totality of the circumstances.

Notwithstanding the district court’s error as to the totality-of-the-circumstances standard used in evaluating the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, the judgment may still be affirmed if qualified immunity applies.

At this stage of the proceeding, there remain material factual issues in dispute on the failure to warn, to utilize the laser sight and to distinguish the different safety locks, all of which are relevant to a decision on the objective reasonableness of the seizure.

The district court’s determination that Deputy Purnell’s conduct was reasonable as a matter of law was thus in error. Because material factual issues exist as to the reasonableness of Deputy Purnell’s actions, summary judgment based on that issue should not have been granted.

The specific context of this case is where a police officer, who would have acted reasonably in using the Taser to apprehend Henry, draws his firearm by mistake and unintentionally shoots Henry instead.

The qualified-immunity inquiry becomes whether an officer in that “specific context” would know that an act of weapon confusion of the firearm for Taser was “clearly established” as an excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment. The answer is that neither in 2003, nor indeed today, is there clearly established law to resolve that question for courts, much less police officers in the field.

The lawfulness of Deputy Purnell’s conduct was “open to reasonable dispute” at the time of the shooting, and officers are personally liable only “for transgressing bright lines,” not for intruding into “gray areas.” Consequently, Deputy Purnell is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on Henry’s § 1983 claim.

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Henry’s state-law claim and remand to the district court, which may then determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. If the district court chooses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Henry’s state-law claim, it may then determine whether Purnell is entitled to statutory immunity under Maryland law.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

Dissent

(Gregory, J.) By allowing an unreasonable mistake to serve as the basis for establishing qualified immunity and focusing its inquiry on Officer Purnell’s intent rather than his or the suspect’s objective behavior, the majority impermissibly transforms the doctrine of qualified immunity into a subjective inquiry that excuses, not guides, reasonable officer conduct.

I respectfully dissent.