Supreme Court clarifies joint employment doctrine

Clarifying the joint employment doctrine, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer was the sole employee of the sheriff’s office and not the construction company that contracted with the office to provide traffic control.

Stephen Lassiter began working for the Robeson County Sheriff’s Office in 2008. As an employee of RCSO, he was able to earn additional income by accepting approved off-duty employment opportunities with prior approval.

Truesdell Corporation, a concrete restoration and repair services company, was awarded a bid from the North Carolina Department of Transportation for repair work to bridges and overpasses along I-95 in Cumberland and Robeson Counties.

As part of the contract, Truesdell was required to design and implement a traffic control and detour plan for the completion of the road work, using uniformed law enforcement officers and marked vehicles.

RCSO provided deputies and was responsible for selecting the deputies for the job, assigning them a traffic control position and getting paperwork back to Truesdell.

On the evening of March 28, 2019, Lassiter was asked by the ranking deputy if he wanted to work that night and he agreed. While Lassiter was directing traffic, he was struck by a vehicle and thrown into the air. He sustained serious injuries and received extensive medical treatment as a result. He then sought to obtain workers’ compensation from both RCSO and Truesdell.

Following a hearing before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, a commissioner concluded that Lassiter was employed by RCSO at the time of his injury but not by Truesdell.

Lassiter appealed and the full commission affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed that he was employed by RCSO but also found that Truesdell was a joint employer.

Truesdell and its insurer appealed.

Writing for the majority in Lassiter v. Robeson County Sheriff’s Department, Justice Tamara Barringer – joined by Justices Philip Berger Jr., Richard Dietz and Trey Allen – reversed in part, finding that RCSO was Lassiter’s sole employer.

The court began by distinguishing the joint employment doctrine from the lent employee doctrine, explaining that the lent employee doctrine requires that the work being done is essentially that of the special employer, while the joint employment doctrine requires that the service for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other.

Concluding the joint employment doctrine applied to Lassiter, the court analyzed its elements, starting with the existence of a contract for hire. An implied contract for hire between Lassiter and Truesdell could be inferred from the circumstances, the court said, as Lassiter knew he would be completing off-duty work for a company engaged in highway repair and Truesdell was aware officers were implementing the traffic control plan.

The second element, the right to control or direct Lassiter’s labor, required consideration of several factors, including whether the alleged employer supplied materials or tools for the plaintiff’s work, the degree to which the alleged employer supervised the plaintiff, whether the alleged employer retained discretion to terminate the plaintiff, the degree to which the alleged employer assigned duties to the plaintiff and the degree to which the alleged employer controlled the manner and method in which the plaintiff carried out his or her duties.

The ultimate inquiry: to determine whether the alleged employer exercised a right to control or direct the details of the work or what the workmen should do as the work progressed, the court added.

RCSO deputies chose which deputies would report to the job site and assigned each their location for work; they also had the responsibility to hire, fire, assign and retain staff. Truesdell never knew which deputies would be working or where their location would be, and did not possess the authority to discharge or even reposition a deputy.

At the job site, deputies exercised considerable independence, and Truesdell never directed nor instructed the manner and method in which Lassiter carried out his duties, nor did it supply any tools or equipment.

“On this record, the indicia of control fall short of establishing Truesdell as a joint employer,” the court wrote. “The extent of Truesdell’s control was twofold: Truesdell designated the locations to station LEOs and the direction to send traffic. However, assigning a worker both a place and a task, by itself, does not suffice to create an employer-employee relationship. … The record before us simply falls short in supplying facts that this Court has recognized as sufficient for establishing control.”

The third element, the nature of the work, also supported a finding that RCSO was Lassiter’s sole employer, as he was engaged in protecting the public safety by directing the route of traffic during road repairs.

“A joint employment relationship arises where a single employee, under contract with two employers, and under the simultaneous control of both, simultaneously performs services for both employers, and those services for each employer is the same as, or is closely related to, that for the other,” the court said. “A careful appraisal of the record reveals that [Lassiter] was not under sufficient control of Truesdell to create joint employment. Therefore, we must hold that RCSO was [Lassiter’s] sole employer.”

Chief Justice Paul Newby filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, writing that he would affirm the determination that Truesdell exercised joint control over Lassiter.

Joined by Justice Anita Earls, Justice Allison Riggs filed a separate dissent, finding sufficient factual evidence that Truesdell should be jointly liable.

Stephen C. McIntyre of McIntyre Law Office in Lumberton, who represented Lassiter, did not respond to a request for comment.

Neither did Charlotte attorney M. Duane Jones of Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, who represented Truesdell nor Allegra A. Sinclair of Goldberg Segalla in Raleigh, who represented RCSO.